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Encouraging reports of dramatic reforms in Myanmar since late 
2011 hide an ugly past.  Until the recent developments, numerous 
allegations of government-perpetrated war crimes and crimes 
against humanity had evoked growing support for a U.N.-led 
commission of inquiry and a potential referral of Myanmar to the 
International Criminal Court.  Perhaps the largest perceived 
obstacle to invoking these international justice mechanisms was the 
anticipated opposition of China, a veto-wielding member of the 
U.N. Security Council and longstanding ally of Myanmar.  This 
article argues that, to the contrary, there is strong evidence that 
China would not block international efforts to prosecute Myanmar 
perpetrators of grave crimes.  The combination of three factors in 
particular support this proposition:  first, China’s voting record on 
the U.N. Security Council reflects a strong reluctance to use its veto 
power; second, economic growth, political stability, and 
international prestige—instead of the defense of other countries’ 
sovereignty—have become paramount to China’s foreign policy; 
and third, in 2004 and 2005, China declined to veto a Commission 
of Inquiry and referral to the ICC of Sudan, another important ally.  
The article suggests that China would also be unlikely to exercise its 
veto power in connection with Myanmar because the economic and 
political costs of permitting a Commission of Inquiry and referral to 
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the ICC of Myanmar are no greater than those that were associated 
with Sudan.  While recognizing that economic and political costs 
are not the only factors that influence China’s decisions on the U.N. 
Security Council, and that the political environments and nature of 
crimes in Sudan and Myanmar are different, the article’s 
comparative analysis seeks to demonstrate how “no” votes on 
investigating and prosecuting crimes in Myanmar would 
nevertheless be out of character for China. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since late 2011, there have been reports of “almost unimaginable 
change” to the political environment in Myanmar.1  Censorship has been 
relaxed, a number of political prisoners have been released, exiles have 
been invited to return, and a law permitting independent trade unions has 
been adopted.2  These changes have captured recent headlines, at least 
momentarily obscuring the government atrocities that have been reported 
over the past several decades.  Yet reports from Myanmar indicate that 
governmental violations of human rights continue,3 some still rising to the 
level of international crimes.4 
                                                
1  Amy Kazmin, Burma: At Freedom’s Gate, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2011, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5576df62-fb37-11e0-8df6-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1c8GcN6rG.  See also Grant Peck, Myanmar Change Is 
‘Dramatic,’ Senior U.S. Diplomat Says, JOURNALGAZETTE.NET, Oct. 10, 2011, 
http://www.journalgazette.net/article/20111010/NEWS0402/111019972/1179.  Burma was 
renamed Myanmar in 1989 by its military leaders.  Political opponents and some 
governments, including the United States, have not accepted the change.  Here the names 
are used without political connotation.  To avoid confusion, in this article “Myanmar” is 
used as the name of the country.  “Burmese” is used for the country’s citizens, for its 
language, and as an adjective.  “Burman” is used for the majority ethnic group. 
2 Kazmin, supra note 1.  Some skeptically view these changes as a mere ploy to warm 
international relations.  See, e.g., Camilla Buzzi, Norwegian Naïveté in Burma?, THE 
IRRAWADDY, Oct. 17, 2011, 
http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=22269&page=1; Daniel Schearf, Burma 
Announces Mass Prisoner Release Amid Skepticism, Caution, VOICE OF AM., Oct. 10, 
2011, http://www.voatibetanenglish.com/content/article--burma-announces-mass-prisoner-
release-amid-skepticism-caution-131512053/1266592.html; see also Myanmar Changes 
Confuse Observers, CHINA POST, Sept. 23, 2011, available at 
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/commentary/the-china-post/special-to-the-china-
post/2011/09/23/317553/Myanmar-changes.htm. 
3 See, e.g., PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BITTER WOUNDS AND LOST DREAMS: HUMAN 
RIGHTS UNDER ASSAULT IN KAREN STATE, BURMA (2012), available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/burma-karen-rpt-ltr-2012.pdf (documenting 
recent human rights abuses in Karen State); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ‘THE GOVERNMENT 
COULD HAVE STOPPED THIS’: SECTARIAN VIOLENCE AND ENSUING ABUSES IN BURMA’S 
ARAKAN STATE (2012), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burma0812webwcover.pdf (reporting 
military abuses during sectarian violence in Rakhine—or Arakan—State). 
4 See, e.g., Trent Franks, Franks: Obama Must Use Burma Visit to Push for Reform: 
Atrocities Still Occurring Under Vicious Army, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2012, available at 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/nov/19/obama-must-use-burma-visit-to-
push-for-reform (noting that “atrocities committed against the Kachin by the Burma Army 
may amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity”); Human Rights Watch, ‘Untold 
Miseries’: Wartime Abuses and Forced Displacement in Burma’s Kachin State, 2012, 
available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burma0312ForUpload_1_0.pdf 
(suggesting that the Burmese Army’s abuses in Kachin State may be war crimes); 
ALTSEAN–BURMA, THE WAR IN KACHIN STATE: A YEAR OF MORE DISPLACEMENT AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES (2012), available at 
http://www.altsean.org/Docs/PDF%20Format/Thematic%20Briefers/The%20war%20in%2
0Kachin%20State%20-
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Before the recent reforms, influential organizations and powerful 
governments were beginning to form a consensus that an international 
commission of inquiry was needed to investigate crimes in Myanmar.  In 
late 2011, the highly regarded international human rights organizations 
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International continued to insist that 
the Myanmar government be held accountable at the international level for 
its crimes.5  In May and September 2011, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on 
the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tomás Ojea Quintana, reported 
                                                                                                           
%20A%20year%20of%20more%20displacement%20and%20human%20rights%20abuses.
pdf (arguing that Burmese army atrocities in Kachin State are war crimes and crimes 
against humanity); KACHIN WOMEN’S ASS’N THAILAND, ONGOING IMPUNITY: CONTINUED 
ARMY ATROCITIES AGAINST THE KACHIN PEOPLE (2012), available at 
http://www.kachinwomen.com/images/stories/publication/ongoing_iimpunity%20.pdf 
(noting that as of June 2012, little had changed since reports of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity first emerged after the start of conflict in 2011).  In late 2011, some even 
noted an increase in government atrocities.  See, e.g., UN General Assembly Fails to Act 
on Crimes Against Humanity in Burma, BURMA CAMPAIGN UK, Nov. 4, 2011, 
http://www.burmacampaign.org.uk/index.php/news-and-reports/news-stories/un-general-
assembly-fails-to-act-on-crimes-against-humanity-in-burma (“[H]uman rights abuses 
which may constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity have significantly increased 
in the past year.”); US Urged on UN-Led Probe into Myanmar Atrocities, as Rapes 
Escalate, TAMIL GUARDIAN, Sept. 27, 2011, 
http://www.tamilguardian.com/article.asp?articleid=3556 (reporting that military fighting 
had actually increased since 2010). 
5  Francis Wade, Burma Seeing ‘Rapid’ Reform: Think Tank, DEMOCRATIC VOICE OF 
BURMA, Sept. 23, 2011, http://www.dvb.no/news/burma-seeing-
%E2%80%98rapid%E2%80%99-reform-think-tank/17799 (noting that Human Rights 
Watch questions whether the Myanmar National Human Rights Council could handle war 
crimes enquiries, implying that international justice mechanisms must be triggered); see 
also Benjamin Zawacki, The Good, Bad and Ugly in Myanmar, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Nov. 
8, 2011, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/MK08Ae01.html (arguing that 
despite some positive political and economic changes, a Commission of Inquiry is still 
needed in Myanmar).  In March 2011, Human Rights Watch called for an international 
commission of inquiry regardless of government reforms due to the duration and severity 
of the alleged atrocities and in its World Report 2012 appeared to express frustration that 
no country had taken leadership at the U.N. to make the commission of inquiry a reality.  
See Human Rights Watch, Burma: Q&A on an International Commission of Inquiry, Mar. 
24, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/24/burma-q-international-commission-inquiry 
(“Even if [the Burmese government] was undertaking reforms, a CoI would be necessary 
given the length and scale of serious abuses.”); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 
2012: EVENTS OF 2011 (2012), at 300, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/wr2012.pdf (“Despite support from 16 
countries for a proposed United Nations commission of inquiry on serious violations of 
international humanitarian law by all parties to Burma’s internal armed conflicts, no 
country took leadership at the UN to make it a reality.  Foreign government officials 
expressed their optimism about government reforms despite abundant evidence of 
continuing systematic repression.”).  Even in late 2012, Human Rights Watch has reported 
that the Myanmar’s army is “just as abusive as it was two years ago.”  See David Scott 
Mathieson, A Bridge Too Far for Obama, Crossed Too Early, in Myanmar, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH, Nov. 18, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/18/bridge-too-far-
obama-crossed-too-early-myanmar. 
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continued widespread violence and abuse, reiterating his call for a U.N. 
Commission of Inquiry to investigate state crimes.6  Supporters also 
included Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, a previous U.N. Human Rights Special 
Rapporteur for Myanmar,7 and the governments of the United Kingdom,8 
Australia, 9  the United States, 10  France, 11  Slovakia, 12  Canada, 13  New 
Zealand,14 Hungary,15 the Netherlands,16 Ireland,17 Lithuania,18 the Czech 
                                                
6  Tomás Ojea Quintana, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in 
Myanmar, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in 
Myanmar, ¶ 74, U.N. Doc. A/66/365 (Sept. 16, 2011); Myanmar: Situation of Ethnic 
Minority Groups Restricts Transition to Democracy—UN Special Rapporteur, UNITED 
NATIONS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, May 23, 2011, 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11048&LangID
=E. 
7 Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, End Burma’s System of Impunity, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/28/opinion/28iht-edpineiro.html?_r=2. 
8 Simon Tisdall, UK Backs Move to Refer Burma’s Leaders to War Crimes Tribunal, THE 
GUARDIAN, Mar. 25, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/mar/25/uk-backs-case-
against-burma. 
9 Human Rights Council, Human Rights Council Considers Human Rights Situations in 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Myanmar, U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Mar. 15, 2010, 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=9909&LangID=
E. 
10  Kelley Currie, Commissioning Justice for Burma, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB30001424052748703846604575448423918526854.html. 
11 Thomas Muang Shwe, France Joins Calls for UN Inquiry into Burma Abuses, MIZZIMA, 
Sept. 23, 2010, http://www.mizzima.com/news/world/4391-france-joins-calls-for-un-
inquiry-into-burma-abuses.html. 
12  Commission of Inquiry Inches Closer to Realization, MIZZIMA, June 10, 2010, 
http://www.mizzima.com/news/world/4019-commission-of-inquiry-inches-closer-to-
realization-.html. 
13 Lee Berthiaume, Canada Throws Support Behind Burma Inquiry, EMBASSY, Sept. 8, 
2010, http://www.embassymag.ca/page/view/burma-09-08-2010. 
14 Burma Campaign New Zealand, Burma Campaign New Zealand Welcomes the New 
Zealand Government’s Endorsement of a Commission of Inquiry on Burma, BURMA 
PARTNERSHIP, Sept. 21, 2010, http://www.burmapartnership.org/2010/09/burma-campaign-
new-zealand-welcomes-the-new-zealand-governments-endorsement-of-a-commission-of-
inquiry-on-burma. 
15  European MPs Welcome Hungary Support for Burma Crimes Inquiry, BURMA 
CAMPAIGN UK, Sept. 6, 2010, http://www.burmacampaign.org.uk/index.php/news-and-
reports/news-stories/european-mps-welcome-hungary-support-for-burma-crimes-
inquiry/142. 
16 Netherlands Supports UN Burma Crimes Inquiry, BURMA CAMPAIGN UK, Sept. 21, 
2010, http://www.burmacampaign.org.uk/index.php/news-and-reports/news-
stories/netherlands-supports-un-burma-crimes-inquiry/142. 
17 Thomas Maung Shwe, Ireland Weighs in on UN Inquiry into Burma Abuses, MIZZIMA, 
Sept. 25, 2010, http://www.mizzima.com/news/world/4405-ireland-weighs-in-on-un-
inquiry-into-burma-abuses.html. 
18 Thea Forbes, Lithuania Joins Chorus Seeking UN Inquiry on Burma Abuses, MIZZIMA, 
Sept. 29, 2010, http://www.mizzima.com/news/world/4412-lithuania-joins-chorus-seeking-
un-inquiry-on-burma-abuses.html. 
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Republic, 19  Denmark, 20  Belgium, 21  Estonia, 22  and Latvia. 23   In-depth 
reports by the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School, 
Physicians for Human Rights, and Amnesty International, and a joint 
study by the International Federation for Human Rights, ALTSEAN-
Burma,24 and the Burma Lawyers’ Council, all concluded that evidence of 
grave crimes in Myanmar warrants criminal accountability measures at the 
international level.25  The Burmese democracy leader, Nobel Peace Prize 
winner, and current member of Myanmar’s Parliament, Aung San Suu Kyi, 
also expressed support for a Commission of Inquiry on government 
crimes.26 
The recent political developments in Myanmar, however, have led 
some to soften their stance.  In March 2012, Special Rapporteur Quintana 
emphasized that primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting 
serious violations of international humanitarian law and international 
human rights law belongs to the Myanmar government, and that “the 
international commission of inquiry is only one option for ensuring that 
justice is dispensed, accountability is established and impunity is 
                                                
19  Simon Roughneen, Czech Supports UN War Crimes Inquiry on Burma, THE 
IRRAWADDY, Apr. 8, 2010, http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=18242. 
20 Thomas Maung Shwe, Denmark, Latvia Support UN Commission of Inquiry, MIZZIMA, 
Mar. 11, 2011, http://www.mizzima.com/news/world/4998-denmark-latvia-support-un-
commission-of-inquiry.html. 
21 Thomas Maung Shwe, Belgium Supports Burma UN Commission of Inquiry, MIZZIMA, 
Feb. 4, 2011, http://www.mizzima.com/news/world/4844-belgium-supports-burma-un-
commission-of-inquiry.html. 
22 European Parliamentary Caucus on Burma, European MPs Welcome Estonia Support for 
Burma Crimes Inquiry, BURMA PARTNERSHIP, Oct. 8, 2010, 
http://www.burmapartnership.org/2010/10/european-mps-welcome-estonia-support-for-
burma-crimes-inquiry. 
23 Thomas Maung Shwe, supra note 20. 
24 The Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (ALTSEAN-Burma) is “a network of 
organizations and individuals based in ASEAN member states working to support the 
movement for human rights and democracy in Burma.”  About Us, ALTSEAN-BURMA, 
http://www.altsean.org/Aboutus.htm (last visited July 23, 2012). 
25 AMNESTY INT’L, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN EASTERN MYANMAR 47–49, 55 (2008), 
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA16/011/2008/en/72d2e8c2-b9ce-
4afb-91c6-ba3391ed41e5/asa160112008en.pdf; INT’L FED’N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ET AL., 
BURMA/MYANMAR: INTERNATIONAL CRIMES COMMITTED IN BURMA: THE URGENT NEED 
FOR A COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 25–27 (2009), available at 
http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/bu08.pdf; INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC AT HARVARD LAW 
SCH., CRIMES IN BURMA 91–92 (2009), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/hrp/documents/Crimes-in-Burma.pdf; PHYSICIANS 
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, LIFE UNDER THE JUNTA: EVIDENCE OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN 
BURMA’S CHIN STATE 59 (2011), available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/life-under-the-junta-burma-chin-state.pdf. 
26 Ko Htwe & Lalit K. Jha, Suu Kyi Urges US Support for CoI, THE IRRAWADDY, June 23, 
2011, http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=21551. 
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averted.” 27   U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Amnesty 
International agreed, suggesting that a domestic judicial process could be 
appropriate.28  Whether other supporters similarly have a change of heart 
remains to be seen. 
 Under normal circumstances, commencing a criminal case does 
not require the support of powerful countries, U.N. officials, or human 
rights groups.29  Instead, allegations are simply brought to a prosecutor 
who determines whether sufficient evidence exists to proceed.  At the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”), for instance, the Prosecutor 
typically will begin an investigation based on the request of a country that 
is a member of the ICC, 30  or based on information received from 
                                                
27  Tomás Ojea Quintana, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in 
Myanmar, Progress Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in 
Myanmar, ¶ 74, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/67 (Mar. 7, 2012). 
28 Press Availability in Rangoon, Burma, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Dec. 2, 2011, available at 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/12/178103.htm (quoting Secretary Clinton as 
saying, “[w]ith regard to the Commission of Inquiry, we always and consistently support 
accountability for human rights violations, and we are looking for ways to support the 
changes that are underway [sic] here because we hope that there will be an internal 
mechanism accountability”); AMNESTY INT’L, MYANMAR: REVISITING HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
MYANMAR, May 25, 2012, at 5, available at http://www.amnesty.org/zh-
hant/library/asset/ASA16/003/2012/en/62cc4319-a779-4c9e-93c8-
0a3945203411/asa160032012en.pdf (“So long as its independence and impartiality are 
assured, a domestic process could be as appropriate as an international mechanism, 
including a UN-established Commission of Inquiry, for which Amnesty International 
advocated exclusively in 2010 and 2011.” (emphasis in original)). 
29 Forming a Commission of Inquiry is not the equivalent of opening a case at the 
International Criminal Court (the “ICC”), but it is widely acknowledged as the first 
investigative step towards a legal case.  An ICC referral is not the only course of action 
that the United Nations could take.  In the past, the U.N. Security Council has established 
ad hoc tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, after investigations by Commissions of 
Experts.  See generally Tribunals and Other Mechanisms, UNITED NATIONS RULE OF LAW, 
http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=18 (describing the varied judicial and quasi-
judicial “processes and mechanisms” employed at the United Nations, and listing some of 
the hybrid tribunals and investigatory commissions that have been established to date); 
About the Court, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www2.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ (detailing in brief the creation of the ICC, after “[a] 
general agreement [was reached] that an independent, permanent criminal court was 
needed” to address international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and the crime of aggression). 
30 Situations in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali, and the Central African 
Republic have all been referred by countries that are “States Parties,” i.e., members of the 
ICC.  See All Situations, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www2.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations (listing all situations which have 
currently been referred to the ICC and providing information on the referring parties); Mali 
Crisis: ICC Launches Inquiry into ‘Atrocities’, BBC NEWS, July 18, 2012, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18893233 (reporting the request by the Malian 
government to investigate atrocities allegedly committed in rebel-held areas). 
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individuals or organizations.31  No U.N. involvement or stamp of approval 
is necessary. 
 Myanmar, however, is not a typical case because it has not ratified 
the Rome Statute, the founding statute of the ICC.  Thus, the ICC has no 
jurisdiction in Myanmar.  Importantly, however, the drafters of the Rome 
Statute made one crucial exception to the ICC’s lack of jurisdiction over 
non-signatories:  the U.N. Security Council, acting pursuant to its Chapter 
VII powers relating to international peace and security, can “refer” 
situations in non-signatory countries, like Myanmar, to the ICC.32  While 
this exception provides a loophole for those seeking justice in Myanmar, it 
also politicizes the case.  Before anyone can even imagine Myanmar’s 
notorious former ruler, Senior General Than Shwe, on trial at the ICC, the 
U.N. Security Council must first be convinced to exercise its referral 
power.33  This is an enormous political hurdle that most observers believe 
is too high.34  Each of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security 
Council (the United States, the United Kingdom, China, Russia, and 
France) has the power to veto non-procedural matters, such as an ICC 
referral.  The consensus is that China and Russia would almost certainly 
block such a referral.35  In fact, both China and Russia have spoken 
                                                
31  This is called an investigation motu proprio (of one’s own motion or accord).  
Investigations of situations in Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire began as investigations motu 
proprio.  See, e.g., Manuel Ventura, Proprio Motu Investigation by the ICC Prosecutor: 
Under What Circumstances Can the Prosecutor Initiate Investigations Proprio Motu?, 
PEACE & JUSTICE INITIATIVE, http://www.peaceandjusticeinitiative.org/implementation-
resources/proprio-motu-investigation-by-the-icc-prosecutor. 
32 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 13(b), opened for signature July 
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, available at http://www2.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757-ABE7-
9CDC7CF02886/283503/RomeStatutEng1.pdf.  Thus far, only the situations in Sudan and 
Libya have been referred by the U.N. Security Council to the ICC. 
33 While a variety of U.N. actors can initiate commissions of inquiry, such as the U.N. 
Secretary-General, the U.N. Human Rights Council, the U.N. General Assembly, and the 
U.N. Security Council, only the Security Council has the power to refer to the ICC the case 
of a non-signatory country.  See Agence France-Presse & Democratic Voice of Burma, US 
Backs UN Inquiry in Burma, DEMOCRATIC VOICE OF BURMA, Aug. 18, 2010, 
http://www.dvb.no/news/us-backs-un-inquiry-in-burma/11323; Mark L. Goldberg, 
Commissions of Inquiry, the Human Rights Council and the ICC, U.N. DISPATCH, Aug. 18, 
2010, http://www.undispatch.com/commissions-of-inquiry-the-human-rights-council-and-
the-icc; Amnesty International Public Statement: Myanmar: UN General Assembly Should 
Call for Commission of Inquiry, AMNESTY INT’L (Sept. 3, 2010), 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA16/011/2010/en/f47ea10e-e9fe-460d-996c-
bd476d242173/asa160112010en.html. 
34 This comment is based on the author’s conversations and attendance in meetings with 
colleagues and NGO employees working on Myanmar issues. 
35 See, e.g., Tisdall, supra note 8 (reporting that, according to Britain’s Ambassador to the 
United Nations Sir Mark Lyall Grant, the U.N. Security Council’s five permanent members 
were “not sufficiently unanimous” on the question of referral).  For views that China or 
Russia would veto a referral, see, for example, Mark L. Goldberg, Momentum for Burma 
Commission of Inquiry Seeming to Falter, U.N. DISPATCH, Oct. 25, 2010, 
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directly on the issue, strongly denouncing all efforts to commence a U.N. 
Commission of Inquiry in Myanmar.36 
 This article concludes that, contrary to conventional wisdom, 
China may not be such a sure “no” vote.  In 2005, observers similarly 
claimed that China would not permit a U.N. Security Council referral of 
the situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the ICC.37  Like Myanmar, Sudan had 
not ratified the ICC’s Rome Statute.38  Yet in 2005, in a historic moment 
for the ICC, the U.N. Security Council made its first referral to the 
Prosecutor of the ICC.39  Eleven members voted in favor, including Russia, 
none against, and Algeria, the United States, Brazil, and China 
abstained.40  The referral’s approval was a “shock” to the international 
                                                                                                           
http://www.undispatch.com/momentum-for-burma-commission-of-inquiry-seeming-to-
falter; Kevin J. Heller, UK: Send Burma to the ICC, OPINIO JURIS, Mar. 26, 2010, 
http://opiniojuris.org/2010/03/26/uk-send-burma-to-the-icc; David S. Mathieson, 
Commission of Inquiry for Burma is Long Overdue, THE BANGKOK POST, Mar. 28, 2010; 
John Pomfret, U.S. Supports Creation of UN Commission of Inquiry into War Crimes in 
Burma, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/08/17/AR2010081706026.html; Simon Roughneen, Quintana 
Recommends UN War Crimes Commission on Burma, THE IRRAWADDY, Mar. 11, 2010, 
http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=18013; Benjamin Zawacki, Amnesty Int’l 
Myanmar Researcher, Remarks at Royal Inst. of Int’l Affairs, Myanmar’s 2010 Elections: 
A Human Rights Perspective, May 11, 2010, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA16/007/2010/en/38ec32d1-d538-45df-8359-
fd09cbe84373/asa160072010en.html. 
36 Colum Lynch, China Campaigning Against International Probe of Possible War Crimes 
in Burma, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/10/25/AR2010102503168.html. 
37 See, e.g., Robert Cryer, Sudan, Resolution 1593 and International Criminal Justice, 19 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 195, 203–04 (2006); Jack Goldsmith, Support War Crimes Trials for 
Darfur, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2005, at A5; Renee Dopplick, UN Acts on Sudan but Ignores 
Darfur, INSIDE JUSTICE, Mar. 24, 2005, 
http://cyberwonders.com/law/index.php/intl/2005/03/24/icc; Eric Reeves, ‘At this Moment, 
Terrible Things Are Happening Today in Darfur, Sudan’－Kofi Annan, January 24, 2005, 
to the UN General Assembly, SUDANREEVES.ORG, Jan. 27, 2005, 
http://www.sudanreeves.org/2005/01/27/at-this-moment-terrible-things-are-happening-
today-in-darfur-sudan---kofi-annan-january-24-2005-to-the-un-general-assembly-january-
24-2005/; Brian Smith, Conflict over Sudan on United Nations Security Council, WORLD 
SOCIALIST WEB SITE, Feb. 28, 2005, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/feb2005/sudn-
f28.shtml; Adam Wolfe, Trying Times in Darfur and the Establishment of International 
Criminal Law, GLOBAL POL’Y FORUM, Mar. 4, 2005, 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/164/28502.html. 
38 See Ayad Derbal, The ICC’s Involvement in the Situation in Darfur: Not a Threat to 
Peace 2 (Univ. of Notre Dame Ctr. for Civil & Human Rights, Working Paper No. 1, 
2008), available at http://www.nd.edu/~ndlaw/cchr/papers/ayad_The_ICC_and_Darfur.pdf 
(noting that Sudan has signed but not ratified the Rome Statute). 
39 Press Release, Sec. Council, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to 
Prosecutor of Int’l Criminal Court, U.N. Press Release SC/8351 (Mar. 31, 2005). 
40 Id. 
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community.41   In 2011, further demonstrating China’s willingness to 
overlook the sovereignty concerns of an ally, the U.N. Security Council 
unanimously referred the situation in Libya, another non-signatory, to the 
ICC.42  No country abstained. 
 This article seeks to evaluate what China’s abstention on the 
referral of Sudan may mean for the possibilities of a Commission of 
Inquiry or of an eventual referral of Myanmar to the ICC.43  In particular, 
this article examines the economic and political risks that China had to 
accept in order to abstain on Sudan, and speculates as to how those risks 
would compare if China abstained on Myanmar.44  China’s evolving 
foreign policy objectives, its voting history on the U.N. Security Council, 
and its economic and political relationships with Sudan and Myanmar all 
indicate that today, the opposite of 2005 is true:  rather than an abstention 
surprising anyone, it would be more surprising to see China veto a 
Commission of Inquiry regarding or an ICC referral of Myanmar. 
 A preliminary word of caution:  Sudan and Myanmar are vastly 
different nations.  They have different relationships with China.  They are 
viewed differently by the international community.  Myanmar in 2012 is 
not Sudan in 2005.  Despite these differences, there is much to be learned 
from China’s abstentions on Sudan and its relationships with Sudan and 
Myanmar.  Through an evaluation of these relationships and China’s 
recent behavior on the U.N. Security Council, this article seeks to unearth 
the fundamental considerations of China’s current foreign policy and 
extrapolate how China would evaluate a vote relating to crimes in 
Myanmar. 
 As background, Part II of this article describes China’s voting 
history on the U.N. Security Council and its primary foreign policy 
motives, revealing that China rarely uses its veto power and that it has 
shifted away from protecting national sovereignty, tending to place more 
value on international prestige. 
                                                
41 Rosanna Lipscomb, Restructuring the ICC Framework to Advance Transitional Justice: 
A Search for a Permanent Solution in Sudan, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 185 n.22 (2006). 
42 S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011). 
43 While this article focuses on Sudan, China’s relationship with Libya could be viewed 
similarly to support the inference of a potential Chinese abstention on Myanmar.  See infra 
Part IV (discussing briefly the Libya referral). 
44 For an extensive analysis of China’s U.N. Security Council voting record, see Joel 
Wuthnow, Beyond the Veto: Chinese Diplomacy in the United Nations Security Council 
18–19 (2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University), available at 
http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac%3A132019 (arguing that “China will be 
more likely to cooperate with the U.S. [on Security Council action] when: (1) alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms, such as UN mediation, have failed; (2) the U.S. has made 
concessions or side-payments that limit the risks of agreement for China; (3) Washington 
has applied high-level diplomatic pressure on Beijing; (4) Russia’s position has shifted 
towards the U.S.; and (5) regional stakeholders have endorsed the U.S. position”). 
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 Part III traces the development of the U.N.’s Commission of 
Inquiry regarding and its ICC referral of Sudan, focusing on China’s role, 
Sudan’s reaction to China’s abstentions, and the tensions between the two 
nations that the referral generated. 
 Part IV briefly discusses the referral of Libya to the ICC, and 
China’s role in those deliberations. 
 Part V explains the basis for a Commission of Inquiry regarding 
Myanmar and possible referral to the ICC, tracing the proposal from its 
roots to the international stage. 
 Since continued domestic economic growth and political stability 
are the primary drivers of China’s foreign policy, Parts VI and VII 
examine China’s economic relationships with Sudan and Myanmar, while 
Parts VIII and IX evaluate these nations’ political relationships.  Part X, 
the conclusion, sums up the analysis advanced in this article and briefly 
notes possible accountability mechanisms other than the ICC. 
 The analysis reveals some startling facts.  For instance, contrary to 
what one might expect based on population and proximity, China is much 
more economically dependent on Sudan than it is on Myanmar.  
Furthermore, China depends on Sudan and Myanmar for less than one 
percent of its overall trade, while for Sudan and Myanmar, China is 
respectively one’s largest and the other’s second-largest trading partner.  
These facts suggest the enormous disparity of economic power that China 
wields over these two allies.  The same is true for political leverage.  As 
rogue regimes facing constant pressure from the West, Sudan and 
Myanmar need China’s political support much more than China needs 
them.  Perhaps most notably, diplomatic relations between China and 
Sudan actually improved following the ICC referral, demonstrating 
Sudan’s inability to retaliate against China for betrayal on the referral vote.  
These observations by no means guarantee that China would vote to 
approve a Commission of Inquiry on crimes in Myanmar or a referral of 
Myanmar’s former leaders to the ICC, but they cast doubts on the 
assumption that China would exercise its veto power to prevent such 
actions. 
II. MODERN MOTIVATIONS FOR CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY 
A. China’s Voting History on the U.N. Security Council 
An examination of China’s voting history on the U.N. Security 
Council indicates that, perhaps surprisingly, China is one of the Council’s 
most cooperative members.  China has to a large extent adopted an 
abstention strategy, by which it attempts to please both its allies and its 
rivals.  Since the creation of the Security Council in 1945, China has in 
fact rarely voted “no.”  From the P.R.C.’s ascension to the United Nations 
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in November 1971 through October 2011, a period of 40 years, China 
voted “no” only seven times.45  This is in comparison to 127 “no” votes by 
the Soviet Union and Russia, 83 by the United States, 32 by the United 
Kingdom, and 18 by France.46 
 China’s recent voting history illustrates that its reputation as a 
principal adversary to Western objectives is misplaced.47  Indeed, the 
Security Council is more collegial than is often thought:  from 1999 to 
2009, 98% of all resolutions passed, and only 5% had any abstentions.48  
China used three vetoes (one on Myanmar) and sixteen abstentions (five 
on Sudan) during this period.49  China was thus only the third-most 
frequent veto user and the second-most frequent abstainer among the 
Council’s permanent members.50  Out of the five permanent members, 
during this period, China never used its veto power without an ally, and 
was third most likely to be the lone abstention.51 
 In fact, since the Security Council began to meet in 1946, only 
two of China’s “no” votes have been liberum vetoes that single-handedly 
caused resolutions to fail.52   Instead of using its veto power, China 
                                                
45  See Report of the Open-Ended Working Grp. on the Question of Equitable 
Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Sec. Council and Other Matters 
Related to the Sec. Council 13–17, U.N. Doc. A/58/47; GAOR, 58th Sess., Suppl. No. 47 
(2004); Changing Patterns in the Use of the Veto in the Security Council, GLOBAL POL’Y 
FORUM, http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/102/32810.html (last 
visited July 23, 2012); United Nations Documentation: Research Guide, DEP’T OF PUB. 
INFO., DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD LIBRARY, http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact.htm (last 
visited July 23, 2012). From 1946 to 1971, China’s vote in the United Nations was 
controlled by the Republic of China, now based in Taiwan.  The R.O.C. made one negative 
vote during this period, blocking in 1955 Mongolia’s admission to the United Nations; this 
stance was reversed in 1960 due to Soviet pressure.  China and the United Nations—
Definition, WORDIQ.COM, 
http://www.wordiq.com/definition/China_and_the_United_Nations (last visited July 23, 
2012).  These statistics do not include negative votes on specific paragraphs. 
46 Changing Patterns in the Use of the Veto in the Security Council, supra note 45; United 
Nations Documentation: Research Guide, supra note 45.  The vast majority of “no” votes 
among all the permanent members were made before 1995.  It should be noted that these 
figures include “no” votes from the entire period of the U.N.’s existence, including the 
years between 1946–71 before the P.R.C. joined.  Id. 
47  Katie Lynch, China and the Security Council: Congruence of the Voting Between 
Permanent Members, 5 CHINA PAPERS 3 (2009) (“China is simply not the recalcitrant 
antagonist on the Security Council that it is sometimes portrayed to be.”).  But see Syria 
Conflict: West ‘Appalled’ by Russia China UN Veto, BBC NEWS, July 19, 2012, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18914578 (reporting that China recently 
joined Russia in three vetoes over the situation in Syria). 
48 Id. at 2. 
49 Id. at 3–4. 
50 Id. at 3. 
51 Id. at 9. 
52 Yitzhak Shichor, China’s Voting Behavior in the UN Security Council, CHINA BRIEF, 
Sept. 6, 2006, 
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consistently abstains on matters that it considers to interfere in other 
countries’ internal affairs or to undermine national sovereignty; before its 
most recent veto on a resolution that would have threatened international 
sanctions on Syria’s leadership, it had never affirmatively voted against 
the imposition of sanctions or the use of force.53  This practice has been 
explained as a way of keeping friends and avoiding making enemies:  
“[i]n this way—typical of Beijing’s behavior in the UN as well as 
reflecting its cultural legacies—the Chinese are able to send a message 
and yet avoid the necessity of taking sides and alienating allies.”54  The 
selectivity with which China uses its veto appears intended to maximize 
its self-interest: 
 
[A]bstention has become a kind of normative veto, an 
expression of “principled opposition” without standing in 
the way of the majority will. . . .  The most obvious 
explanation for such behavior is the desire to retain 
maximum leverage as part of its indeterminate strategy of 
becoming all things to all nations on many issues 
intruding on the Security Council agenda.55 
 
 While China’s voting record does not tell us how it would vote on 
a referral of Myanmar to the ICC, it clearly indicates that China is 
reluctant to use its veto power and that it carefully weighs a number of 
competing foreign policy interests when deciding how to vote.  This 
article will now turn to a discussion of those interests. 
B. China’s Evolving Foreign Policy Concerns 
China’s current foreign policy interests further support the notion 
that China is far from an automatic “no” vote on a Commission of Inquiry 
or a referral of Myanmar to the ICC.  Today, China’s foreign policy 
reflects its desires for political stability, economic prosperity, and 
international prestige.  Its modern-day decision-makers have become more 
and more practical, and rather than taking entrenched ideological positions 
have favored cooperation and compromise in order to fuel their nation’s 
continued rise.  Significantly, this pragmatic approach to foreign policy 
                                                                                                           
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=32007
&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=196&no_cache=1. 
53 Id.  Shichor’s article does not account for China’s 2007 “no” vote on the draft resolution 
on the situation in Myanmar. 
54 Id. 
55 Samuel S. Kim, China and the United Nations, in CHINA JOINS THE WORLD: PROGRESS 
AND PROSPECTS 42, 61–62 (Elizabeth Economy & Michel Oksenberg eds., 1999). 
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has eroded China’s traditional position of defending sovereignty at all 
costs. 
China’s foreign policy decisions reflect both a grand strategy for 
building the country’s wealth and power, and a domestic strategy for 
maintaining the rule of the Communist Party.56  To that end, Chinese 
leaders promote stable international and regional environments in which 
their country’s economy can thrive and its position of power can 
improve.57  As the Chinese people’s belief in Marxism has deteriorated, 
China’s domestic strategy for Communist Party survival has focused on 
rapid economic growth and a rise in living standards.58 
To maintain international stability, China’s foreign policy 
principles have increasingly reflected pragmatic concerns.  China is now 
“interested in maintaining normal relationships with as many countries as 
possible, in order to maximize the substantial economic benefits it 
receives from current levels of involvement in the world economy.”59  Its 
policies vis-à-vis other countries now depend to a great extent on the 
prospects for advantageous trade with them, with expectations for positive 
economic outcomes reflected in cooperative diplomatic behavior. 60  
Moving away from its past ideological concerns, China now adopts 
international norms when they benefit the nation’s foreign policy goals, 
but strongly rejects them when they interfere with China’s vital interests.61  
While China’s rhetoric on international issues is often strong and 
uncompromising, its actions, in contrast, are restrained and 
accommodating.62 
This shift away from ideology has made China’s position on state 
sovereignty more flexible.  During the 1980s, China’s position was that 
sovereignty was a “sacred right.”63  Since the Tiananmen killings in 1989, 
however, China has become increasingly cooperative when state 
sovereignty is at issue, evidenced by a significant increase in its 
                                                
56 PHILLIP C. SAUNDERS, INST. FOR NAT’L STRATEGIC STUD., CHINA’S GLOBAL ACTIVISM: 
STRATEGY, DRIVERS, AND TOOLS 3 (2006). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 3–4. 
59 Barry Naughton, The Foreign Policy Implications of China’s Economic Development 
Strategy, in CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 47, 66 (Thomas W. 
Robinson & David Shambaugh eds., 1994). 
60  Rex Li, Security Challenge of an Ascendant China—Great Power Emergence and 
International Stability, in CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: PRAGMATISM AND STRATEGIC 
BEHAVIOR 23, 24 (Suisheng Zhao ed., 2004). 
61  Suisheng Zhao, Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior, in 
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: PRAGMATISM AND STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR, supra note 60, at 3, 4–
5. 
62 Id. at 6. 
63 Allen Carlson, More than Just Saying No: China’s Evolving Approach to Sovereignty 
and Intervention Since Tiananmen, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF CHINA’S FOREIGN 
POLICY 217, 221 (Alastair Iain Johnston & Robert S. Ross eds., 2006). 
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involvement in international interventions.64  Influential Chinese foreign 
policy elites and international relations experts helped to effect gradual 
change, as they came to understand how participation in international 
interventions could benefit China’s global image.65  China’s approaches to 
sovereignty and intervention are widely misunderstood:  although in its 
words China proclaims its official support of sovereignty and non-
intervention, in its actions it generally agrees to humanitarian 
interventions in times of crisis, and has even begun to support such 
missions actively.66  China’s support of the referral of Libya to the ICC is 
concrete evidence of this trend. 
China has also become more concerned with its image in recent 
years.67  Chinese leaders are “eagerly seeking stature, acceptance, honor, 
and respect everywhere on the world stage.”68  As China has become more 
focused on global social recognition and on “externally based political 
legitimacy,” its international cooperation has increased.69  In fact, since 
the mid-1990s, international status has appeared to be the overriding 
motivating factor in Chinese international relations—even more important 
than power.70 
In sum, Chinese foreign policy is more supportive of international 
cooperation than is generally acknowledged.  However, this increased 
willingness to intervene in what are often arguably internal affairs should 
not be overstated.  China’s 2007 “no” vote to stop a Security Council 
resolution pushing Myanmar towards democracy, primarily due to 
concerns for state sovereignty, is a vivid reminder that respect for 
                                                
64 Id. at 218.  In 1990, for example, China supported the Security Council’s condemnation 
of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and joined in the demand that Iraq withdraw.  Id. at 221–22; 
see also Chengqiu Wu, Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Responsibility: Changes in 
China’s Response to International Human Rights Crises, 15 J. CHINESE POL. SCI. 71 (2010). 
65 Carlson, supra note 63, at 218, 225–26. 
66 Id. at 234.  Research focusing on China’s position on intervention in conflict situations 
indeed reveals that China evolved from principled opposition and non-participation in the 
1970s, to support and non-participation in the 1980s, to support and participation in the 
1990s.  Jonathan Holslag, China’s Diplomatic Victory in Darfur, 2.4 BRUSSELS INST. OF 
CONTEMPORARY CHINA STUD. (BICCS) ASIA PAPERS 2 (2007), 
http://www.oxfamsol.be/nl/IMG/pdf/Rap_China_Darfur.pdf.  This change has been 
explained in a variety of ways, including China’s purported recognition that its interests 
can be advanced through utilization of the Security Council, its realization that cooperation 
is necessary to co-exist with the West, its economic and security interdependence and 
maturation as a world power, and its socialization and learning after decades as a member 
of the Security Council.  Id. 
67 Zhao, supra note 61, at 14. 
68 Fei-Ling Wang, Beijing’s Incentive Structure: The Pursuit of Preservation, Prosperity 
and Power, in CHINA RISING: POWER AND MOTIVATION IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY 19, 39 
(Yong Deng & Fei-Ling Wang eds., 2005). 
69 Yong Deng & Fei-Ling Wang, Introduction, in CHINA RISING, supra note 68, at 1, 11. 
70 Yong Deng, Better than Power: ‘International Status’ in Chinese Foreign Policy, in 
CHINA RISING: POWER AND MOTIVATION IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 68, at 51–
52, 62. 
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sovereignty remains a vital component in China’s foreign policy 
considerations.71 
III. THE REFERRAL OF SUDAN TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 
The U.N. Security Council’s proposed referral in 2005 of the 
situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the ICC was an important litmus test for 
China.  How would it balance, on one hand, its own economic interests in 
Sudan and its longstanding view that internal matters are not appropriate 
for U.N. Security Council action, and on the other hand its increased 
interest in enhancing its international image and in cooperating in 
international coalitions? 
A. The Conflict in Darfur 
The roots of the conflict that led to the crisis in Darfur date back 
to at least 1955, when disagreements over unification of the southern 
(predominantly Christian and Animist) and northern (predominantly Arab 
and Muslim) parts of the country led to a mutiny by southern army units.72  
In 1972, the two sides reached a cease-fire agreement that led to a ten-year 
hiatus in the conflict.73  However, the leader of Sudan, a born-again 
Muslim who came to power in 1969 by military coup, steadily reduced the 
South’s autonomy, as part of his goal of creating an Islamic state.74  
Hostilities resumed between the North and the South in 1983.75  In 1989, 
Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, a little-known brigadier in the Sudanese 
Army, led a military coup that overthrew the government.76  In 1993, he 
dissolved the ruling military junta and appointed himself president.77  
Fighting between North and South would last for twenty-two years and 
take almost two million lives.78  In 2005, a peace agreement was finally 
                                                
71 For a discussion of China’s vote, see infra Part IX. 
72 MOHAMED H. FADLALLA, SHORT HISTORY OF SUDAN 140–41 (2004). 
73 Id. at 142–43. 
74 FRANCIS MADING DENG, WAR OF VISION: CONFLICT OF IDENTITIES IN THE SUDAN 12 
(1995). 
75 MILLARD BURR & ROBERT O. COLLINS, DARFUR: THE LONG ROAD TO DISASTER 239 
(2006). 
76 DIANA CHILDRESS, OMAR AL-BASHIR’S SUDAN 9 (2010). 
77  FACTBOX—Sudan’s President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, REUTERS, July 14, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/07/14/uk-warcrimes-sudan-bashir-profile-
idUKL1435274220080714. 
78  Peter Walker, Profile: Omar al-Bashir, THE GUARDIAN, July 14, 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/14/sudan.warcrimes3. 
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signed between the Southern rebels and the Northern-oriented national 
government.79 
Since the 1980s, while the conflict between North and South 
Sudan raged on, ethnic rebels in Darfur, a region of Western Sudan, had 
also been fighting against Arab militias supported by the central Sudanese 
government.80  Triggering the crisis that would make the Darfur situation 
known worldwide, in 2003, rebels claiming economic marginalization 
attacked government troops.81  In response, the government-supported 
Arab Janjaweed militia began ethnic cleansing of local tribes.82  Inter-
rebel fighting, and the outbreak of hostilities in 2005 across Sudan’s 
border with Chad, which borders Darfur to the west, compounded what 
became a humanitarian crisis;83 indeed, the conflict in Darfur has been 
described as “one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world.”84  
Refugees reported that government air raids preceded slaughtering, raping, 
and pillaging carried out by the Janjaweed.85  On September 9, 2004, U.S. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell announced that genocide had been 
committed in Darfur, based upon a consistent and widespread pattern of 
atrocities that included killings, rapes, and the burning of villages.86 
Powell’s statement coincided with U.S. efforts to establish a U.N. 
Commission of Inquiry to determine whether the Sudanese government 
                                                
79 Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead, INT’L CRISIS GROUP 
(Afr. Report No. 106, Mar. 31, 2006), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-
of-africa/sudan/106-sudans-comprehensive-peace-agreement-the-long-road-ahead.aspx. 
80 Lipscomb, supra note 41, at 188. 
81  U.S. State Dep’t Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor & Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research, Documenting Atrocities in Darfur, in 2 AN ORAL AND 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE DARFUR GENOCIDE 163, 168 (Samuel Totten ed., 2011). 
82 Nick Meo, Sudanese Government Backed Darfur Attacks, Says Janjaweed Commander, 
THE TELEGRAPH, (Jul. 12, 2008, 10:22 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/sudan/2403635/Sudane
se-government-backed-Darfur-attacks-says-Janjaweed-commander.html; see also Dwight 
D. Murphey, ‘Do Something About Darfur’: A Review of the Complexities, 33 J. SOC., POL. 
& ECON. STUD. 229 (2008) (arguing that the Darfur conflict was caused by a complex set 
of factors including demographics, geography, history, economics, and factionalism); 
Q&A: Sudan’s Darfur Conflict, BBC NEWS, Feb. 23, 2010, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3496731.stm (reporting that the government of 
Sudan denies that it is allied with the Janjaweed). 
83 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, ‘They Came Here to Kill Us’: Militia Attacks and Ethnic 
Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad, at 6, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 9, 2007), 
http://www.hrw.org/node/11075/section/1 (describing the deterioration in Sudan-Chad 
relations after “Sudanese government officials suspicious of Chadian support to the Darfur 
rebels began to provide material backing to [rebel movements in Chad,]” and the 
humanitarian crises engendered by the conflict on both sides of the border). 
84 Sudan: Humanitarian Situation in Darfur One of Worst in the World—UN Officials, U.N. 
NEWS CENTRE, May 4, 2004, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=10615&Cr=sudan&Cr1=. 
85 Q&A: Sudan’s Darfur Conflict, supra note 82. 
86  Powell Calls Sudan Killings Genocide, CNN NEWS, Sept. 9, 2004, 
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/africa/09/09/sudan.powell. 
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and militia were responsible for genocide. 87   At that time, Security 
Council members Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom backed the 
resolution, but China warned that it might veto it.88  Thus began Sudan’s 
journey towards the ICC. 
B. The Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 
On September 18, 2004, the U.N. Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1564, determining that the situation in Darfur was a threat to 
international peace and security, and requesting that the Secretary-General 
establish an international commission of inquiry for the purpose of 
investigating reports of violations of humanitarian and human rights law 
in Darfur.89No members voted against the Resolution; China, Russia, 
Pakistan, and Algeria abstained.90  China’s abstention from Resolution 
1564 and its comments thereon were consistent with the pattern described 
supra in Part II of this article:  with its words, China supported and 
defended Sudan, but with its deeds, it declined to stop Security Council 
action that adversely affected its ally.  Behaving typically, China’s 
Ambassador to the United Nations in his comments on Resolution 1564 
dodged the Commission of Inquiry topic and instead complimented Sudan 
and the African Union, calling on fellow countries to support diplomatic 
efforts.91 
Beginning its work on October 25, 2004, the Commission made 
two evidence-gathering missions to Sudan, and visited refugees in 
neighboring Chad, Eritrea, and Ethiopia. 92   Three months later, the 
Commission issued its report, which concluded that the Janjaweed and the 
Sudanese government had violated human rights and humanitarian laws.93  
Their crimes included the burning of villages, the mass murder of civilians, 
widespread and systematic rape, torture, forcible displacement, and 
enforced disappearances; to the extent that these crimes were carried out 
on a discriminatory basis and in a systematic and widespread manner, they 
                                                
87 Glenn Kessler & Colum Lynch, U.S. Calls Killings in Sudan Genocide, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 10, 2004, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A8364-2004Sep9.html. 
88 Id. 
89 S.C. Res. 1564, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1564 (Sept. 18, 2004). 
90 Press Release, Sec. Council, Security Council Declares Intention to Consider Sanctions 
to Obtain Sudan’s Full Compliance with Security, Disarmament Obligations on Darfur, 
U.N. Press Release SC/8191 (Sept. 18, 2004). 
91 Id. 
92 Report of the Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Sec’y-Gen., U.N. 
Doc. S/2005/60 (Feb. 1, 2005); John L. Washburn & Wasana Punyasena, The Commission 
of Inquiry on Darfur: A United Nations Success Story, 10 UNA-USA POLICY BRIEF 3 
(2005). 
93 Report of the Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Sec’y-Gen., 
supra note 92, at ¶ 630. 
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also constituted crimes against humanity.94  While the Commission did not 
find evidence that the Sudanese government intended to commit genocide, 
it nonetheless recognized that individual government officials might have 
acted with genocidal intent.95  Concluding that many of the alleged crimes 
“meet all the thresholds of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal 
Court,” the Commission strongly recommended that the Security Council 
refer the situation to the ICC pursuant to Article 13(b) of the Rome 
Statute.96 
C. ICC Jurisdiction over Non-Signatory Countries 
Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, 97  the legal authority for 
bringing the situation in Darfur before the ICC, has been the subject of 
considerable controversy.98  In essence, it empowers the U.N. Security 
Council to grant jurisdiction to the ICC over situations in any country, 
even those countries that have not ratified the Statute.99  This Section (C) 
introduces Article 13(b) and briefly addresses questions of its legitimacy. 
 As a general rule of international law, a country that does not 
ratify a treaty is not bound by it.100  Neither rights nor obligations arise for 
non-signatories.101  The Rome Statute, however, contemplates a deviation 
from this axiom.  In general, Article 12(2) of the Rome Statute102 provides 
that either of two preconditions must exist for the ICC to exercise 
jurisdiction over a crime:  (a) the crime must have been committed in the 
territory of a state that is a party to the Rome Statute, or that has accepted 
the jurisdiction of the Court, or (b) the person accused of the crime must 
be a national of such a state.  In other words, the ICC cannot act in a 
country, or against a citizen from a country, that has not either ratified the 
Rome Statute or consented to the ICC’s jurisdiction.  However, critically, 
                                                
94 Id. at ¶¶ 631–38. 
95 Id. at ¶¶ 640–41. 
96 Id. at ¶ 647. 
97 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 32, art. 13(b). 
98 See Chris Gallavin, Prosecutorial Discretion Within the ICC: Under the Pressure of 
Justice, 17 CRIM. L. F. 47 (2006) (noting that the relationship between the Security Council 
and the ICC was one of the top three issues debated in 1988 during the Rome Conference 
where the Rome Statute was adopted). 
99 See BRUCE BROOMHALL, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT: BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 79 (2003) (noting that Security 
Council referrals to the ICC were originally justified because they allowed the ICC to act 
in lieu of ad hoc tribunals). 
100 MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 90 (5th ed. 2003).  An exception to the rule:  
where a treaty codifies customary law, a non-signatory remains bound.  Id.  There is little 
basis to argue, however, that the Rome Statute reflects customary law. 
101 Monika Lueke & Chanaka Wikremasinghe, Analytical Report, in TREATY MAKING—
EXPRESSION OF CONSENT BY STATES TO BE BOUND BY A TREATY 1, 8 (Council of Europe 
ed., 2001). 
102 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 32, art. 12(2). 
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these two Article 12(2) jurisdictional preconditions only apply to:  (a) 
situations referred to the ICC Prosecutor by a State Party, and (b) 
situations in which the Prosecutor’s office has initiated investigations 
itself.  They do not apply to Article 13(b) situations, i.e., situations 
referred to the ICC by the U.N. Security Council acting under Chapter VII 
of the U.N. Charter.103  Thus, when Articles 12(2) and 13(b) are read in 
conjunction, it becomes clear that lying between these two subsections is a 
loophole that permits jurisdiction over non-signatory nations, because the 
preconditions of Article 12(2), which require ratification or consent, do 
not apply to referrals by the U.N. Security Council to the ICC.  This boils 
down to the following:  the ICC may prosecute nationals of states that are 
not parties to the Rome Statute, such as Sudan and Myanmar, for crimes 
committed in those countries, if and when the U.N. Security Council so 
decides.104 
 The power of the U.N. Security Council to refer non-signatory 
states under Article 13(b) has been hotly criticized as a violation of basic 
principles of international law.105  Analysts have pointed out, however, 
that these referrals can be viewed as reflections of the Security Council’s 
powers under the U.N. Charter, to which all U.N. members are bound.106  
                                                
103 Id. art. 13(b).  Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter gives the Security Council authority to 
act in cases involving threats to international peace and security. 
104 Cf. HÉCTOR OLÁSOLO, THE TRIGGERING PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 92 (2005) (noting that as a precondition to referral, the Security Council must 
determine that the situation poses a threat to international peace, is a breach of the peace, 
or is an act of aggression); Philippe Kirsch et al., International Tribunals and Courts, in 
THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE 21ST CENTURY 281, 288 (David 
Malone ed., 2004) (discussing important limitations on Article 13(b) referrals). 
105 See, e.g., HANS KÖCHLER, THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS ADMINISTRATOR OF JUSTICE? 49–
55 (2011) (arguing that Article 13(b) referral power contradicts the norm of sovereign 
equality, undermines the legitimacy of jurisdiction under the Rome Statute, and weakens 
international criminal justice because of the political nature of referrals); John Laughland, 
The ICC and Universal Jurisdiction: ‘Ubi Lex Voluit, Dicit; Ubi Noluit, Tacit’, ICC 
WATCH (Mar. 2009), http://www.iccwatch.org/article_Mar09.html (arguing that 
jurisdiction over non-parties is not expressly granted in the Rome Statute, and that Article 
13(b) should be interpreted narrowly to apply only to situations involving nationals of state 
parties in the territories of state parties); ALEXANDER MEZYAEV, INST. OF DEMOCRACY & 
COOPERATION, THE LEGALITY OF THE INDICTMENT OF PRESIDENT BASHIR: INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE ICC PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER DECISION ON THE ARREST WARRANT 
AGAINST THE PRESIDENT OF SUDAN, Apr. 6, 2009, http://www.idc-europe.org/en/The-
legality-of-the-ICC-indictment-of-President-Bashir (arguing that the Security Council can 
only act pursuant to the U.N. Charter, which does not allow for referrals relating to non-
signatories); cf. Robert Cryer, International Criminal Law vs State Sovereignty: Another 
Round?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 979 (2005) (discussing the interplay between the ICC and 
sovereignty). 
106 See, e.g., GIDEON COPPLE, THE AM. NON-GOV’TAL ORG. COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIM. 
COURT, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE ICC DARFUR INVESTIGATION, June 6, 2007, 
http://www.amicc.org/docs/Darfur%20Q&A.pdf; Vera Gowlland-Debas, The Relationship 
Between the Security Council and ICC, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, 2001, 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/164/28588.html. 
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Hence, under certain conditions, the ICC’s jurisdiction derives its 
legitimacy not from treaty obligations but by virtue of Security Council 
action. 107   One commentator has argued that because Sudan was 
represented in the 2003 and 2004 meetings of the U.N. General Assembly, 
when the relationship between the United Nations and the ICC was 
established, implying the acceptance of Article 13(b) by the member states 
of the United Nations, it cannot object to ICC and United Nations 
coordination on referrals.108  From a practical perspective, the argument 
against ICC jurisdiction over non-states parties referred by the U.N. 
Security Council is now of merely academic interest:  the Security Council 
has recognized that jurisdiction exists, making use of it in its Sudan and 
Libya referrals, and the judges of the ICC have accepted review of the 
Darfur situation, concluding that it falls within the jurisdiction of their 
court.109 
D. The Referral of the Situation in Darfur to the ICC 
Turning back to Darfur:  on March 31, 2005, a little over three 
months after the issuance of the Commission of Inquiry’s report, the U.N. 
Security Council referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC.110  Resolution 
1593, introduced by Britain and Northern Ireland, was approved with 
eleven votes in favor, none against, and abstentions by China, the United 
States, Brazil, and Algeria.111 
 In China’s sixteen-sentence statement accompanying the vote, 
only one sentence provided any support for the Resolution:  “[L]ike other 
                                                
107 Dapo Akande, The Legal Nature of Security Council Referrals to the ICC and its 
Impact on Al Bashir’s Immunities, 7.2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 333 (2009); Max du Plessis & 
Christopher Gevers, Darfur Goes to the International Criminal Court (Perhaps), 14.2 AFR. 
SEC. REV. 23 (2005), available at http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/14No2/F2.pdf. 
108 Innocent Mawire, Darfur and the International Criminal Court: Some Jurisdictional 
Issues, INT’L LAW OBSERVER, Oct. 15, 2008, 
http://internationallawobserver.eu/2008/10/15/darfur-and-the-international-criminal-court-
some-jurisdictional-issues. 
109 ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Fifth Report of the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), at 8–9 (June 
7, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/CE794D3B-ED91-4D86-A28E-
3F61E6C44083/277796/OTP_ReportUNSC5Darfur_English.pdf.  The ICC would have 
jurisdiction over crimes committed in Myanmar by a citizen of a signatory even without a 
referral.  For example, Htoo Htoo Han, now an Australian citizen, admitted to committing 
war crimes as an officer in Myanmar’s military intelligence.  However, his crimes were 
committed prior to 2002, the effective date of the Rome Statute.  See Mike Hedge, 
Australian Admits War Crimes in Burma, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, July 18, 2011,  ng-
news-national/australian-admits-war-crimes-in-burma-20110718-1hkug.html (reporting on 
executions of anti-government student leaders in which Htoo Htoo Han was involved 
during Myanmar’s 1988 student uprising). 
110 S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005). 
111 U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5158th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5158 (Mar. 31, 2005). 
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members of the international community, we deeply deplore the gross 
violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in 
Darfur.”112  The remainder of the statement expressed support for attempts 
to settle the situation in Darfur under the auspices of the African Union, 
concern that efforts be made to ensure that the ICC case not negatively 
impact movement towards peace, and a preference that any trial take place 
within the Sudanese judicial system. 113   Noting China’s strong 
disagreement over the referral, Chinese Ambassador Wang Guangya 
added:  “We cannot accept any exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction against 
the will of non-State parties, and we would find it difficult to endorse any 
Security Council authorization of such an exercise of jurisdiction by the 
ICC.”114  So if China strongly opposed the referral, why did it abstain, 
rather than exercise its veto?  In fact, China had reportedly assured 
Sudanese officials that it would not permit Resolution 1593 to pass.115 
 Answering the above question requires a great deal of speculation, 
as, unfortunately, there are no statements from the Chinese government 
that directly and candidly answer it.116Analysts seem to cluster around the 
theory that international political pressure was too great for a veto.  
Mayank Bubna speculates that the referral went through because the 
Security Council was facing increasing political isolation and public 
activism.117  Claudio Guler hypothesizes that “normative pressures” likely 
convinced China to abstain.118  Josh Kurlantzick argues that China worries 
little about freedom or human rights, but instead cares most about stability 
for its economic interests, its reputation as a responsible actor on the world 
                                                
112 Id. at 5. 
113 See Derbal, supra note 38, at 5–11 (noting that Sudan’s domestic justice system appears 
neither willing nor able to adequately prosecute the alleged crimes); Julie B. Martin, The 
International Criminal Court: Defining Complementarity and Divining Implications for the 
United States, 4 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 107, 115 (2006) (observing that the ICC 
Prosecutor determined that the Sudanese justice system was unwilling or unable to 
genuinely prosecute the most egregious offenders in the Darfur conflict). 
114 U.N. Doc. S/PV.5158, supra note 111, at 5. 
115 China Defends Decision Not to Veto Darfur ICC Referral, SUDAN TRIB., Nov. 11, 2009, 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article33085. 
116 See id. (relating how, when asked directly as to why China declined to “give full 
support to Africa” on the question of referral, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao 
sidestepped the ICC aspect of the question, instead addressing how China supported 
increased African representation on the Security Council). 
117 Mayank Bubna, The ICC’s Role in Sudan: Peace Versus Justice, EURASIA REV., Apr. 
28, 2010, http://www.eurasiareview.com/2010/04/iccs-role-in-sudan-peace-versus-
justice.html. 
118 Claudio Guler, Slow Dancing with Sudan, INT’L REL. & SEC. NETWORK, May 8, 2009, 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?ots591=4888caa0-
b3db-1461-98b9-e20e7b9c13d4&lng=en&id=100004. 
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stage, and to some extent the safety of its citizens abroad.119  Christine 
Chaumeau asserts that the political cost of threatening a veto was too high 
for China, given the grave nature of the alleged crimes.120  Jonathan 
Holslag writes that China believed that the ICC referral would not threaten 
Sudanese officials because the court’s work would depend on cooperation 
from the Sudanese government.121 
 The truth probably lies somewhere among all of these answers.  
Surely China’s longstanding practice of trying to please all sides must 
have played some role in its decision to abstain.  Its newfound 
preoccupation with international prestige was also likely a factor, 
particularly after the United States began calling the situation “genocide.”  
Probably, China attempted to weigh the cost of abstention against its 
benefit.  China probably determined, based on the foreign policy 
motivations outlined in Part II, that the potential political and economic 
detriment to its relationship with Sudan that would be caused by an 
abstention was outweighed by the benefit of aligning with the 
international community by implicitly supporting action against patent 
atrocities. 
E. Post-Referral Fallout 
Sudan’s response to the referral tested whether China had 
calculated its benefits and detriments correctly.  The government of Sudan 
was clearly angry over the referral and over China’s refusal to exercise its 
veto power.122  The National Islamic Front, the political organization 
controlling the Sudanese government, immediately rejected Resolution 
1593.123  President al-Bashir took an oath three times that he would never 
hand anyone over to the Court.124  Some feared that foreigners would 
                                                
119 Josh Kurlantzick, China, Burma and Sudan: Convincing Argument, NEW REPUBLIC 
ONLINE, May 11, 2006, available at 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18329. 
120 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, INVESTING IN TRAGEDY: CHINA’S MONEY, ARMS, AND POLITICS IN 
SUDAN 18, n. 177 (2008) (explaining China’s failure to veto resolution 1593 as a result of a 
belief that ‘doing so would have carried too high a political cost, given the gravity of the 
crimes in question,’ and citing Christine Chaumeau’s article, “Beijing’s Calculated 
Prudence,” in the International Justice Tribune (Oct. 23, 2006)), available at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/080311-cah-investing-in-tragedy-
report.pdf. 
121 Holslag, supra note 66, at 7. 
122 Chris Buckley, China Has ‘Grave Concerns’ over ICC Sudan Decision, REUTERS, July 
15, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSPEK27439220080715?pageNumber=2. 
123 Eric Reeves, Darfur and the International Criminal Court, MIDDLE E. RESEARCH & 
INFO. PROJECT, Apr. 29, 2005, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero042905. 
124 Id. 
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become targets of violence.125  Atrocities temporarily increased.126  Some 
Westerners even criticized the referral as taking attention away from 
humanitarian assistance.127 
 Something of a test of wills then began between the ICC and the 
Sudanese government.  First, the government of Sudan refused to allow 
the ICC Prosecutor’s team to open an office in Sudan, instead establishing 
its own Special Criminal Court for Events in Darfur.128  Then, in April 
2007, after the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber issued arrest warrants for Sudan’s 
former Minister of State for the Interior, who was responsible for 
recruiting, funding, and arming the Janjaweed militia, and for a militia 
leader who was allegedly involved in a string of massacres and other 
violations, including widespread rape, the Sudanese government continued 
to resist.  It kept the Minister in his new position as Minister of State for 
Humanitarian Affairs, and even appointed him to lead an inquiry into 
allegations of human rights abuses in Darfur.129  A formal request by the 
ICC to the Sudanese government to hand over the two men was met with 
defiance.130 
 Predictably, China continued to publicly support Sudan, and 
behind the scenes worked to protect its ally.  After the ICC Prosecutor 
delivered a report describing Sudan’s uncooperativeness, China, along 
with Qatar, reportedly undermined the U.N. Security Council’s efforts to 
issue a Presidential Statement in response.131  In July 2008, a British-
                                                
125 “Far from providing a deterrent effect, the ICC referral poses readily discernible 
dangers to both civilians and humanitarian aid workers.  How could it be otherwise when 
those effectively indicted, and thus faced with extradition, still control Sudan?  Who could 
imagine that senior members of the NIF would ever subject themselves to the authority of 
international justice? . . . .  Knowledgeable Darfuris in exile and regional intelligence 
sources speak urgently of the strong sense within the humanitarian aid community that, in 
the event of an ICC referral, the [J]anjaweed will be encouraged by Khartoum to escalate 
attacks on foreigners, especially aid workers.  These concerns were partly confirmed in an 
April 25 Washington Post dispatch from the Nyala region.”  Id. 
126 Nick Grono & David Mozersky, Sudan and the ICC: A Question of Accountability, 
INT’L CRISIS GRP., Jan. 31, 2007, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-
africa/sudan/op-eds/sudan-and-the-icc-a-question-of-accountability.aspx. 
127 See, e.g., Reeves, supra note 123 (“So exclusively was the focus on achieving an ICC 
referral that the morally more immediate and compelling need for humanitarian 
intervention and civilian protection received only an advocacy nod.”). 
128 Alex de Waal, Darfur, the Court and Khartoum: The Politics of State Non-Cooperation, 
in COURTING CONFLICT?  JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA 29, 30 (Nicholas Waddell 
& Phil Clark eds., 2008). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 31. 
131 China Shields Sudan in the Security Council After ICC Prosecutor’s Report, HUMAN 
RIGHTS FIRST, Dec. 17, 2007, 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/darfur/2007/alert/181/index.htm.  A Presidential 
Statement is a statement issued by the President of the Security Council on behalf of the 
Council.  See, e.g., Sec. Council Presidential Statement 2012/5, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2012/5 
(Mar. 6, 2012) (condemning violence between Sudan and South Sudan, and urging both 
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drafted Presidential Statement on Sudan was also withdrawn after Chinese 
opposition.132 
 China continued voicing support for Sudan when the ICC 
Prosecutor announced genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes 
charges against Sudanese President al-Bashir.133  During a trip to Sudan in 
the fall of 2008, China’s special envoy and Assistant Foreign Minister 
emphasized China’s “consistent position”:  support of the resolution of the 
Darfur issue through political means.134 
 The ICC’s issuance of an arrest warrant for President al-Bashir in 
March 2009 on charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes 
brought additional tension.  Al-Bashir reportedly retorted that the ICC 
could eat the warrant, and he danced in front of thousands of supporters 
who burned an effigy of the ICC Chief Prosecutor. 135   Some were 
concerned that the indictment would damage the peace process.136  China 
opposed it, saying that it would not contribute to peace and stability,137 
and China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman expressed China’s “regret and 
worries.”138 
 Although China faced a great deal of pressure to respond to 
Sudan’s defiance, it continued to remain passive and non-committal.  In 
January 2010, China’s Ambassador to Sudan said that China would adopt 
a “clear and suitable stance” if the ICC were to “issue a decision against 
                                                                                                           
countries to reach a border demarcation agreement and to “implement and respect . . . their 
10 February Memorandum of Understanding on Non-Aggression and Cooperation”), 
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10568.doc.htm.  “The Presidency 
of the Security Council is held in turn by the members of the Security Council in the 
English alphabetical order of their names.  Each President holds office for one calendar 
month.”  Members, U.N. SEC. COUNCIL, http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp (last visited 
July 24, 2012). 
132 TED DAGNE, SUDAN: THE CRISIS IN DARFUR AND THE STATUS OF THE NORTH-SOUTH 
PEACE AGREEMENT 12 (2010). 
133 Peter Walker & James Sturcke, Darfur Genocide Charges for Sudanese President Omar 
al-Bashir, THE GUARDIAN, July 14, 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/14/sudan.warcrimes1. 
134 Special Envoy of the Chinese Government and Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun 
Visits Sudan Successfully, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA (Sept. 4, 2008), 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/xybfs/gjlb/2883/2885/t511195.htm. 
135  Warrant Issued for Sudan’s Leader, BBC NEWS, Mar. 4, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7923102.stm. 
136  See, e.g., Marlise Simons & Neil MacFarquhar, Court Issues Arrest Warrant for 
Sudan’s Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2009, at A6 (noting that United Nations diplomats, 
the Arab League, the African Union, and some humanitarian organizations were concerned 
that the arrest warrant would threaten peace talks). 
137 China Opposes ICC Warrant for Sudan’s President, VOICE OF AM., Nov. 2, 2009, 
http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-2009-03-05-voa9-68812787/412939.html. 
138 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang’s Regular Press Conference on March 5, 
2009, EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE U.K., Mar. 7, 2009, 
http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/zt/fyrth/t540975.htm. 
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Al-Bashir.”139  Commenting on the possible application of Article 16 of 
the Rome Statute,140 which allows the U.N. Security Council to freeze ICC 
action on referral cases for up to twelve months, the Ambassador was 
reported as merely confirming “extensive consultations” and indicating 
support for Sudanese sovereignty.141  China’s strategy of providing moral 
support for Sudan during the ICC proceedings, while refraining from 
using its considerable power to protect Sudan directly, reinforces the 
notion that it seeks to be a friend to all: 
 
China has distanced itself from the recent warrant debate 
altogether, although it condemned al-Bashir’s original 
arrest warrant when it was first issued.  China is in a 
difficult position regarding the ICC charges; while it 
wants to portray itself as a “team player” and a benevolent 
power, China has substantial oil assets in Sudan.  Backing 
out is China’s best course of action because it neither 
condemns the ICC’s new warrant—an action that would 
sour its relations with the West—nor does it demand al-
Bashir’s arrest, which could hinder its oil supply from 
Sudan.142 
 
 In April 2010, Sudan held its first open presidential election in 
twenty-four years.  The ICC remained a “looming shadow” over the 
election.143  “To the Hague” was scribbled on six ballots in a small town in 
western Sudan.144  On April 26, al-Bashir was announced the winner, 
having received 68% of the vote.145  Although he had hoped the election 
results would help him defy the ICC warrant, the election was tainted by 
accusations of widespread fraud and other irregularities.146  In July 2010, 
the ICC issued a second arrest warrant for al-Bashir, this time for 
                                                
139 Embassy of the Republic of Sudan in London, Sudan and ICC: Chinese Ambassador 
Says China Will Adopt Clear Stance if ICC Issues Decision Against President Al-Bashir, 
http://www.sudan-
embassy.co.uk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=253%3Asudan-and-
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140 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 32, art. 16. 
141 See Embassy of the Republic of Sudan in London, Sudan and ICC, supra note 139 
(erroneously referencing Article 16 of the U.N. Charter). 
142 Christian Pelfrey, In Focus: Sudan—The Global Fight for (and Against) al-Bashir’s 
Arrest, PULITZER CTR. ON CRISIS REPORTING, July 26, 2010, 
http://pulitzercenter.org/blog/news-points/focus-sudan-global-fight-and-against-icc. 
143 Mohammed Abdulrahman, ICC Looms over Sudan Election, 104 INT’L JUST. TRIB. 1, 
Apr. 21, 2010, available at http://sites.rnw.nl/pdf/ijt/IJT104.pdf. 
144 Id. 
145  Sudan Elects Wanted Bashir as President, REUTERS, Apr. 26, 2010, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE63P1P220100426. 
146 Id. 
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genocide.147  African and Arab governments, as well as China, lobbied for 
postponement of the indictment.148  On March 1, 2012, the ICC issued a 
warrant for the arrest of Abdelrahim Mohamed Hussein, Sudan’s current 
defense minister, who is accused of crimes against humanity and war 
crimes.149 
 As of the end of 2012, all four Sudanese suspects remained at 
large.150  Despite the ongoing nature of their cases, at this time it is clear 
that, for the most part, China’s abstentions paid off.  While the indictments 
presumably caused acute diplomatic headaches for China, its primary 
interests of increasing trade with Sudan, promoting political stability in the 
region, and attaining prestige through international cooperation were all 
satisfied.  Today, China’s trade with Sudan continues to blossom;151 while 
Sudan remains one of the world’s most challenging environments, it is 
relatively stable;152 and China can legitimately claim that it did not prevent 
the pursuit of justice in reaction to the situation in Darfur.  If the ICC’s 
involvement in Sudan had caused additional instability and damaged 
China’s economy, the prospects for a Commission of Inquiry in Myanmar 
would be less viable.  The arguably benign impact (to China) of China’s 
abstentions on Sudan, however, has helped pave the way for a U.N. 
investigation into crimes in Myanmar and a possible referral to the ICC. 
                                                
147 Darfur Warrant for Sudan’s Bashir: ICC Adds Genocide, BBC NEWS, July 12, 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10603559. 
148 Id. 
149 ICC Issues Sudan Defence Minister Warrant Over Darfur, BBC NEWS, Mar. 1, 2012, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17226952. 
150 In 2009, the ICC issued summonses to appear to three Sudanese rebel leaders.  All three 
appeared.  One case was dropped due to a lack of evidence while the court approved trials 
for the other two suspects.  See Darfur: Sudan Rebels to Face ICC War Crimes Trial, BBC 
NEWS, Mar. 8, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12682611.  Trial dates have 
not yet been set. 
151 See infra Part VI. 
152 Stability for Sudan should be understood within the context of its history of almost 
constant turmoil.  Sudan has been plagued with internal war for 38 of its 55 years as an 
independent nation.  RICHARD DOWNIE & BRIAN KENNEDY, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L 
STUD., SUDAN: ASSESSING RISKS TO STABILITY 1 (2011), available at 
http://csis.org/files/publication/110623_Downie_Sudan_Web.pdf.  Downie and Kennedy, 
while not optimists about future stability in Sudan, note that the main source of conflict in 
the country ended with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005.  They argue that 
future stability will depend largely on the abilities of North and South Sudan to manage 
their separation, internal political turmoil in al-Bashir’s party, and the spillover effects of 
recent protests and uprisings in the Middle East, Tunisia, and Egypt.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, they also comment that al-Bashir has been a “force for stability . . . albeit a 
brutal, repressive stability” and that his departure “would unleash unpredictable forces.”  
Id. at 11.  The ICC indictment has apparently strengthened his resolve to remain in office, 
because his position gives him added protection against arrest; ironically this may result in 
additional stability for Sudan.  See id. 
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IV. THE REFERRAL OF LIBYA TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 
On February 26, 2011, the U.N. Security Council referred Libya 
to the ICC, its second Chapter VII referral.153  All of the members of the 
Security Council, including China, approved.154  In a brief statement, the 
Chinese representative noted the “special circumstances” in Libya, citing 
bloodshed, violence, civilian casualties, and safety of foreign nationals in 
Libya.155 
As with Sudan, China’s responses to the situation in Libya were 
characterized by vocal resistance to U.N. action mixed with tacit approval 
at the time of voting.  At the outset, China resisted U.N. Security Council 
action in Libya, for example in blocking a no-fly zone over Libya.156  
Although China did not use its veto to stop NATO bombing, it later 
condemned the bombing.157  Reportedly, China was also the only country 
to initially reject the idea of referring Libya to the ICC, although 
apparently a letter from the Libyan ambassador condemning Libyan leader 
Muammar Gaddafi persuaded it otherwise, leading to the unanimous 
approval.158  As in the Darfur situation, China’s pattern of vocal resistance 
                                                
153 S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 42; see also Louis Charbonneau, EU, U.S. to Urge U.N. 
Sanctions on Syria, ICC Referral, REUTERS, Aug. 22, 2011, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/22/us-syria-un-sanctions-
idUSTRE77L6MX20110822 (reporting that a referral of Syria, another non-signatory of 
the Rome Statute, may soon be on the agenda of the Security Council). 
154 S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 42.  The ICC has issued warrants for the arrest of three 
Libyan suspects.  Libyan authorities arrested two of the suspects but have refused to 
surrender them to ICC authorities.  The warrant for the arrest of Muammar Gaddafi was 
dropped following his death in 2011.  Cases and Situations: Libya, COALITION FOR THE 
INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=libya (describing the history of the 
ICC’s involvement in Libya) (last visited Dec. 16, 2012). 
155 Press Release, Sec. Council, In Swift, Decisive Action, Security Council Imposes 
Tough Measures on Libyan Regime, Adopting Resolution 1970 in Wake of Crackdown on 
Protesters, U.N. Press Release SC/10187/Rev.1 (Feb. 26, 2011).  These comments did not 
necessarily refer to the referral itself, as the resolution contained other actions, such as an 
arms embargo, a travel ban, and an asset freeze.  See also Editorial, Libya Sanctions: 
China’s New Role at the UN, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 28, 2011, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/the-monitors-view/2011/0228/Libya-sanctions-
China-s-new-role-at-the-UN (reporting that approximately 30,000 Chinese, working 
primarily in Libyan oil fields, had to flee the violence). 
156 Editorial, Libya Sanctions: China’s New Role at the UN, supra note 155. 
157 Michael Martina & Chris Buckley, China Urges Libya to Protect Investments, REUTERS, 
Aug. 23, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/23/us-china-libya-oil-
idUSTRE77M0PD20110823. 
158 Mark Kersten, China, the ICC and Libya: A New Level of Hypocrisy?, JUSTICE IN 
CONFLICT, Mar. 2, 2011, http://justiceinconflict.org/2011/03/02/china-the-icc-and-libya-a-
new-level-of-hypocrisy/; UNSC Refers Situation in Libya to ICC, Sanctions Gaddafi & 
Aides, SUDAN TRIB., Feb. 27, 2011, http://www.sudantribune.com/UNSC-refers-situation-
in-Libya-to,38116. 
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to U.N. action combined with abstention or approval of U.N. measures at 
the time of voting reflects its strategy of avoiding alienation of friends and 
foes, and supports the argument that China’s strong verbal support for 
Myanmar does not necessarily mean that it would veto a Commission of 
Inquiry.159 
There are some important differences between the Sudanese and 
Libyan referrals.  First, China not only permitted the Libyan referral 
through abstention, it affirmatively approved it, signaling a growing 
acceptance by China of Article 13(b).  Second, the referral of Libya was 
not preceded by a U.N. Commission of Inquiry,160 indicating China’s trust 
in the ICC’s ability to investigate. 
The referral of Libya appears to reflect a shift towards increased 
use of the ICC by the Security Council, particularly because of the way 
the referral was unanimously approved and because of the speed, only 
eleven days after the outbreak of violence, with which the Security 
Council was willing to get involved.161  Before the Libya referral, it would 
have been reasonable to think that there might be no additional Article 
13(b) referrals for a long time to come, due to the difficulty of arresting 
and prosecuting the indicted Sudanese officials, which undermined the 
ICC’s authority (and, indirectly, the Security Council as well).  Instead, 
the Libya referral reconfirmed the Security Council’s confidence in the 
ICC. 
V. CALLS FOR A COMMISSION OF INQUIRY AND THE POSSIBLE 
REFERRAL OF MYANMAR TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT 
The seeds of conflict in Myanmar were planted even before the 
country’s independence from Britain in 1948.162  After independence, 
Myanmar (then named Burma) had a parliamentary form of 
government. 163   Outside the capital, however, communists and rebel 
insurgents exercised considerable authority.164  In this context, the army 
regarded its role to be the principal defender of a Burman state.165  
                                                
159 Libya is a relatively important trade partner for China, exporting 3% of China’s overall 
oil imports, equivalent to about 10% of Libya’s oil exports.  Martina & Buckley, supra 
note 157. 
160 UNSC Refers Situation in Libya to ICC, Sanctions Gaddafi & Aides, SUDAN TRIB., 
supra note 158. 
161 The protests in Libya began on February 15, and the referral was made on February 26.  
See S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 42, at ¶ 4. 
162 Tin Maung Maung Than, Dreams and Nightmares: State Building and Ethnic Conflict 
in Myanmar (Burma), in ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 65, 70–71 (Kusuma 
Snitwongse & W. Scott Thompson eds., 2005). 
163 ASHLEY SOUTH, ETHNIC POLITICS IN BURMA: STATES OF CONFLICT 27 (2008). 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
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Veterans of independence, recalling divisive colonial leadership and 
anarchic wars, were determined to maintain national unity.166  Meanwhile, 
ethnic minorities, called “ethnic nationalities,” 167  complained of 
marginalization168 and began to claim social and political autonomy.169  
Many began armed struggles, prompted by, inter alia, the desire for self-
determination, the underdevelopment of outlying minority areas, and the 
unequal distribution of wealth and power as compared to central 
Myanmar.170  Claiming a threat of civil war, in 1958 military leaders 
seized power through a coup consented to by the civilian government, and 
governed for eighteen months.171  After handing the reins of leadership to 
a civilian government for two years, the military determined that existing 
leaders were incapable of resolving the country’s political and economic 
problems.172  In 1962, a second military coup led to twenty-six years of 
absolute rule by General Ne Win, under the military Revolutionary 
Council; in 1974, his Burma Socialist Programme Party was 
institutionalized in the Constitution as the country’s sole legitimate 
political entity.173  Ethnic rebellions continued.174  In 1988, in response to 
economic failures and civil oppression, protesters took to the streets.175  
Under new leadership, the military once more took the reins of power, 
promising multi-party elections while cracking down on students and 
other activists, some of whom fled to border areas to join ethnic rebel 
groups.176  Hopes for reform were dashed when the junta refused to 
transfer its power after the main opposition parties won nearly 90% of the 
parliamentary seats in the 1990 military-sponsored elections.177  Beginning 
in 1992, the government began organizing a National Convention to draft 
a new constitution that was eventually approved in a National Referendum 
in 2008.178  In November 2010, parliamentary elections were held, and, in 
March 2011, a new President was chosen.179 
                                                
166 Id. 
167 Burmese usually use the term “ethnic nationalities” to refer to ethnic populations other 
than the Burman majority.  The terms “ethnic minorities” and “ethnic groups” are often 
used outside Myanmar to describe ethnic populations.  See SOUTH, supra note 163, at xv 
(finding that elites within ethnic populations prefer the term “ethnic nationalities” because 
it confers greater political status and legitimacy). 
168 Tin Maung Maung Than, supra note 162, at 73–74. 
169 SOUTH, supra note 163, at 29. 
170  Seng Raw, Views from Myanmar: An Ethnic Perspective, in BURMA: POLITICAL 
ECONOMY UNDER MILITARY RULE 159, 159–60 (Robert H. Taylor ed., 2001). 
171 DAVID I. STEINBERG, BURMA: THE STATE OF MYANMAR 13 (2001). 
172 Id. 
173 See id. at 13–14. 
174 Tin Maung Maung Than, supra note 162, at 76. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 76–77. 
177 Id. at 77. 
178  See Burma ‘Approves New Constitution’, BBC NEWS, May 15, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7402105.stm; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
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 Decades of conflict between the military and the ethnic 
nationalities has led to multitudes of reports of widespread government-
perpetrated rape, torture, forced displacement, and other crimes, forming 
the evidentiary basis for a Commission of Inquiry and potential referral of 
Myanmar to the ICC.180  In June 2008, Amnesty International released 
Crimes Against Humanity in Eastern Myanmar, which focused on 
violations of international human rights law and humanitarian law 
                                                                                                           
CHRONOLOGY OF BURMA’S CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS 3 (2008), available at 
www.hrw.org/reports/2008/burma0508/burma0508chronology.pdf.  The National 
Convention and National Referendum were heavily criticized for their lack of 
transparency, participation, and fairness.  See, e.g., Vote to Nowhere, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (May 1, 2008), www.hrw.org/en/node/62239/section/1; THE PUB. INT’L LAW & 
POL’Y GRP., BURMESE CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM: NEITHER FREE NOR FAIR (2008), 
available at 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/PILPG_Report_Burmese_Constitutional_Referendum
_Neither_Free_Nor_Fair-11_May_2008.pdf. 
179  Kocha Olarn, Myanmar Swears in New President, CNN NEWS, Mar. 30, 2011, 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-03-30/world/myanmar.new.government_1_prime-minister-
thein-sein-military-junta-military-rule?_s=PM:WORLD. 
180 See, e.g., ASSISTANCE ASS’N FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS (BURMA), THE DARKNESS WE 
SEE: TORTURE IN BURMA’S INTERROGATION CENTERS AND PRISONS (2005), available at 
www.aappb.org/tortour_report.pdf (detailing torture of political prisoners by government 
authorities); KAREN HUMAN RIGHTS GRP., FORCED LABOUR, MOVEMENT AND TRADE 
RESTRICTIONS IN TOUNGOO DISTRICT (2010), available at 
http://www.khrg.org/khrg2010/khrg10f2.pdf (documenting forced labor conscriptions by 
the military between June 2009 and January 2010); KAREN WOMEN’S ORG., SHATTERING 
SILENCES: KAREN WOMEN SPEAK OUT ABOUT THE BURMESE MILITARY REGIME’S USE OF 
RAPE AS A STRATEGY OF WAR IN KAREN STATE (2004), available at 
http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/Initiatives/kwo_shatteringsilences_april2007.pdf 
(documenting widespread and systematic rape by the Burmese military); ID., STATE OF 
TERROR: THE ONGOING RAPE, MURDER, TORTURE AND FORCED LABOUR SUFFERED BY 
WOMEN LIVING UNDER THE BURMESE MILITARY REGIME IN KAREN STATE (2007), available 
at www.karenwomen.org/Reports/state%20of%20terror%20report.pdf (reporting forced 
labor, forced portering, rape, torture, and other crimes committed by the Burmese military 
against the Karen ethnic population); ASHLEY SOUTH ET AL., DISPLACEMENT AND 
DISPOSSESSION: FORCED MIGRATION AND LAND RIGHTS IN BURMA (2007), available at 
http://www.ashleysouth.co.uk/files/COHRE_November_2007.pdf (focusing on land 
confiscation by government officials, leading to forced displacement).  Forced labor in 
which the oppressor exercises “any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership 
over a person” is—pursuant to Rome Statute art. 7(2)(c)—the prosecutable crime of 
slavery.  See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 32, art. 7(2)(c).  
But see Trevor Wilson, Judging Burma’s Human Rights Abuses: Is There a Role for a 
Commission of Inquiry?, at 2, available at 
http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/blogs/asiarights/files/2011/12/Burma-Human-Rights.pdf, 
(claiming that Myanmar army abuses “often occur in random, isolated incidents rather than 
on a mass level,” that “few [human rights incidents], if any, have been independently 
verified,” and that “many organisations producing [human rights] reports are not 
independent, and not necessarily objective” (emphasis in original)).  In response to 
questions regarding the quality of the documentation of crimes in Myanmar, it is important 
to remember that one of the primary purposes of a commission of inquiry is to impartially 
investigate whether violations have occurred. 
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committed in Kayin (or “Karen”) State and Bago Division of Myanmar 
from 2005 to 2007.  It found that, unlike in previous offensives, the 
Myanmar army was primarily targeting civilians as part of official 
government policy: 
 
The following human rights violations have all taken 
place on a widespread and systematic basis during the 
military offensive: unlawful killings; torture and other ill-
treatment of detainees and prisoners; enforced 
disappearances and arbitrary arrests; the imposition of 
forced labour, portering, and displacement; and the 
destruction or confiscation of crops and food-stocks and 
other forms of collective punishment.  These violations, 
targeting civilians or carried out indiscriminately, have 
been preceded or accompanied by consistent threats and 
warnings by the tatmadaw [Myanmar army] that such 
would occur, and by statements by Myanmar government 
officials.  Amnesty International is concerned that these 
practices have been the result of official government and 
tatmadaw policy, and amount to crimes against 
humanity.181 
 
 Amnesty International concluded that, based on testimonies and 
information collected, the “weight of evidence suggests that some of these 
violations constitute crimes against humanity” as defined by the Rome 
Statute.182   At the time of the report, Amnesty International did not 
specifically call for a Commission of Inquiry or an ICC referral.183  In 
2010, it changed its position to full-fledged support of a Commission and, 
should the Commission conclude that crimes have been committed, an 
ICC referral. 184   Most recently, in 2012, Amnesty International has 
suggested that a Myanmar domestic judicial process, in lieu of a U.N. 
commission, could be appropriate.185 
 Additional evidentiary and analytical support for a Commission of 
Inquiry was provided by Crimes in Burma, a May 2009 report by the 
International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard University.  Relying 
exclusively on U.N. documents for its research, the Clinic concluded that 
“there is a prima facie case of international criminal law violations that 
                                                
181 AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 25, at 2. 
182 Id. at 5. 
183 Zawacki, supra note 35 (noting that at that time, political realities militated against the 
likelihood of seeing a Commission of Inquiry established). 
184 Id.; see also Myanmar: UN General Assembly Should Call for Commission of Inquiry, 
AMNESTY INT’L, Sept. 6, 2010, http://www.amnesty.org.nz/news/myanmar-un-general-
assembly-should-call-commission-inquiry. 
185 See MYANMAR: REVISITING HUMAN RIGHTS IN MYANMAR, supra note 28, at 5. 
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demands U.N. Security Council action to establish a Commission of 
Inquiry to investigate these grave breaches further.”186  Notably, the report 
found that U.N. officials were using precisely the language of the ICC 
statute to describe the crimes in Myanmar and tying the crimes to 
government policy:  the forced relocation was “widespread and ‘part of a 
deliberate strategy,’” 187  abuses including sexual violence were 
“widespread and systematic,” 188  and extrajudicial killings were “a 
deliberate strategy” and also “widespread and systematic.”189  The report 
further found that the situation in Myanmar met the elements of a threat to 
peace 190  and that the Myanmar government had failed to hold the 
perpetrators accountable,191 clearing the path for a U.N. Security Council 
referral and ultimately for ICC jurisdiction.192 
 It is unclear exactly when the connection between Myanmar and 
the ICC was first made.  Two of the earlier published analyses were made 
by the Burma Lawyers’ Council, a group of Burmese lawyers in exile, and 
by the Global Justice Center, a U.S.-based human rights organization, in 
September 2007.193  A partnership was formed in that month between the 
two groups with a view towards obtaining a U.N. Security Council 
resolution forming an international Commission of Inquiry on human 
rights violations and grave crimes.194  Subsequent months saw a number of 
                                                
186 INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC AT HARVARD LAW SCH., supra note 25, at 3. 
187 Id. at 48 (quoting Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, 
Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, ¶ 47, U.N. 
Doc. A/61/369 (Sept. 21, 2006), available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/530/70/PDF/N0653070.pdf?OpenElement).  Ostensibly 
to avoid creating threshold tests, few have tried to compare the atrocities in Myanmar and 
in Darfur.  The Harvard clinic reports that the number of destroyed villages is comparable.  
INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC AT HARVARD LAW SCH., supra note 25, at iii, iv, 2, 88. 
188 Id. at 62. 
189 Id. at 71. 
190 Id. at 89–90. 
191 Id. at 75–76. 
192  Id. at 92 (“[T]he Security Council should be prepared to act upon findings and 
recommendations made by such a Commission, including a potential referral to the 
International Criminal Court.”); see also Burma Briefing—The United Nations General 
Assembly and Crimes in Burma, BURMA CAMPAIGN U.K., July 25, 2010, at 1, available at 
http://burmacampaign.org.uk/images/uploads/2-UNGA-and-Burma.pdf (finding that past 
General Assembly resolutions regarding Myanmar have related to “at least 15 possible war 
crimes and crimes against humanity”); cf. INT’L FED’N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ET AL., supra 
note 25, at 25 (concluding that despite the difficulty in gathering evidence of crimes, 
publicly-available sources reveal “a consistent pattern of widespread and systematic human 
rights violations which constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes, as defined 
under Articles 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute”). 
193  Janet Benshoof, The Changing Landscape of International Law: The Global 
Responsibility to Persecute Perpetrators of Grave Crimes Inflicted on the People of 
Burma, 27 LAWKA PALA 37 (2007); Burma Lawyers’ Council, Legal Analysis of the Burma 
Lawyers’ Council on Heinous Crimes in Burma, 27 LAWKA PALA 34 (2007). 
194 Burma Lawyers’ Council & Global Justice Ctr., Extracts from MOU of BLC and GJC 
for Joint Efforts of Criminal Accountability, 28 LAWKA PALA 32 (2007). 
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statements by both organizations calling for criminal accountability in 
Myanmar.195  By August 2008, key Burmese opposition groups such as the 
National Council for the Union of Burma, Network for Human Rights 
Documentation–Burma, and the Women’s League of Burma, as well as 
international human rights organizations such as the International 
Federation for Human Rights, the U.K.-based Burma Justice Committee, 
and Christian Solidarity Worldwide, had either endorsed or joined in the 
effort.196 
 As of September 2008, however, the interest of the international 
community in bringing Myanmar before the ICC was still “lukewarm.”197  
                                                
195 See, e.g., Burma Lawyers’ Council, Burma Lawyers’ Council Urges the United Nations 
Security Council to Refer the Heinous Crimes in Burma to the International Criminal 
Court, 30 LAWKA PALA 7 (2008); Burma Lawyers’ Council, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s 
Detention Should Be Added to the List of the SPDC’s Crimes Against Humanity, 30 
LAWKA PALA 9 (2008); Burma Lawyers’ Council & Global Justice Ctr., International 
Lawyers Call for Criminal Accountability for Myanmar Regime, 28 LAWKA PALA 35 
(2007); Global Justice Ctr. et al., In the Wake of Historic Resolution 1820 on Sexual 
Violence in Armed Conflict Women of Burma and International Lawyers Call on the 
Security Council to Refer the Situation in Burma to the International Criminal Court, 30 
LAWKA PALA 24 (2008); Int’l Fed’n for Human Rights et al., Catastrophe in Burma a 
Wake Up Call to the International Community: Time to End Impunity for Heinous Crimes 
by the Military Regime, 30 LAWKA PALA 22 (2008). 
196  Burma Lawyers’ Council, Burma Lawyers’ Council Report on the Campaign for 
Criminal Accountability, 30 LAWKA PALA 4, 5 (2008). 
197 B.K. Sen, The International Criminal Court’s Indictment of the Sudanese President for 
Genocide in Darfur and its Relevance to Burma, 31 LAWKA PALA 71, 72 (2008).  Before 
the recent reforms, critics of the formation of a commission of inquiry warned that it would 
deter Myanmar military leaders from accepting democratic reforms.  See, e.g., Colum 
Lynch, U.S. Push for Burmese War Crimes Probe Hits Chinese Wall, FOREIGN POL’Y, Oct. 
24, 2010, 
http://turtlebay.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/10/24/us_push_for_burmese_war_crimes_pr
obe_hits_chinese_wall (reporting on the low-profile and multilateral approach adopted by 
the U.S. in seeking to establish a commission of inquiry with regards to atrocities in 
Myanmar, and contrasting it with China’s “high-octane, Western-style diplomatic effort” 
to oppose any such measure on grounds that a commission of inquiry “could undermine the 
country’s fragile political transition”); see also Mark L. Goldberg, Momentum for Burma 
Commission of Inquiry Seeming to Falter, Oct. 25, 2010, U.N. DISPATCH, 
http://www.undispatch.com/momentum-for-burma-commission-of-inquiry-seeming-to-
falter (citing Colum Lynch’s article in Foreign Policy and explaining that appointment of a 
commission of inquiry on “human rights abuses by the Burmese junta” would likely be 
“off the agenda” during Ban Ki Moon’s October 2010 visit to Southeast Asian countries 
because of an absence of international support).  Now, after reforms have begun, they fear 
that a commission of inquiry would unfairly punish Myanmar and could cause the reforms 
to unravel.  See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 180, at 8 (“Convening a UN Commission of 
Inquiry at this time would be tantamount to imposing new sanctions on Burma at the very 
time when it is making serious efforts to introduce change.”); Simon Roughneen, A 
Decommissioned Inquiry on Myanmar, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Jan. 10, 2012, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/NA10Ae01.html (“With the threat of 
backsliding still looming large … some observers say that it is important to encourage 
Thein Sein’s reform process and not play into the hands of hardliners by pushing for the 
creation of a COI.”). 
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An important turning point for criminal accountability efforts came in 
May 2009 when key stakeholders met in Thailand to discuss the viability 
of a Commission of Inquiry and an ICC referral.  Over three days of 
seminars and meetings, a wide variety of international human rights 
organizations, legal and documentation experts, and Burmese advocates 
debated the timing, usefulness, strategy of, and obstacles to, a 
Commission of Inquiry and a potential U.N. Security Council referral.198  
In a bizarre turn of events, rumors circulated that the Thai and Myanmar 
governments had sent agents to infiltrate the meetings.199  The Myanmar 
government had reportedly issued an arrest warrant for the General 
Secretary of the Burma Lawyers’ Council (“BLC”)200 and was apparently 
trying to either kidnap 201  or kill 202  him.  As the author personally 
experienced, attendees were advised to eat meals in a sheltered inner area 
of the dining room of the hotel meeting venue.  The BLC’s General 
Secretary was spirited away to an anonymous hotel room,203 went into 
hiding, and subsequently left the country for Sweden.204  The rumors of 
spies in the May 2009 meetings created a clear impression:  the Myanmar 
government was concerned about a potential ICC referral.  The BLC’s 
General Secretary confirmed that a war crimes commission “very much 
concerns the Burmese leadership”205 and the Director of Burma Campaign 
UK commented that the provision in the 2008 Myanmar Constitution 
granting government officials immunity from domestic criminal 
prosecution “shows they’re worried” about international prosecution.206 
                                                
198 Although names of attendees are omitted from this article for confidentiality purposes, a 
partial list is publicly available.  Burma Lawyers’ Council, Seminar on Criminal 
Accountability in Burma: ‘Advancing Human Rights and Ending Impunity in Burma: 
Which External Leverages?’, 33 LAWKA PALA 17 (2009). 
199 Shirin Ebadi & Souhayr Belhassen, A Seminar Fraught with Risks, in FIDH/BLC 
SEMINAR: ADVANCING HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENDING IMPUNITY IN BURMA: WHICH EXTERNAL 
LEVERAGES? 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/FIDH_BLC_Burma_seminar_final_internet.pdf. 
200 Press Release: Burma: Outlaw of the Burma Lawyers Council and Harassment of its 
Members, INT’L FED’N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, May 5, 2009, http://www.fidh.org/Press-
Release-Burma-Outlaw-of-the-Burma-Lawyers?envoiamis=1. 
201 Dan Withers, Aung Htoo, BLC: ‘Than Shwe Fears the ICC’, DEMOCRATIC VOICE OF 
BURMA, Oct. 22, 2010, http://www.dvb.no/interview/aung-htoo-blc-%E2%80%98than-
shwe-fears-the-icc%E2%80%99/12370. 
202 Andrew Marshall, Putting Burma’s Junta on Trial, 33 LAWKA PALA 47, 48 (2009) 
(relaying reports that Myanmar agents “had been dispatched to kidnap or kill” the General 
Secretary). 
203 Id. 
204 Withers, supra note 201. 
205 Marshall, supra note 202, at 49. 
206 Id. at 48; see also INT’L CRISIS GRP., CHINA’S MYANMAR DILEMMA 30 (Int’l Crisis Grp. 
Asia Report No. 177) (2009), available at 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/north-east-
asia/177_chinas_myanmar_dilemma.pdf (commenting that a feeling of victimization on the 
part of Myanmar’s then-leader, Senior General Than Shwe, was caused in part by fear of 
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 As awareness of crimes in Myanmar has increased, scores of 
NGOs, members of governments, and prominent individuals have 
expressed support for a Commission of Inquiry.207  Ultimately, however, 
the support that truly matters is that of the U.N. Security Council 
members; 208  significantly, three of the countries that have expressed 
support—France, the United Kingdom, and the United States—are 
permanent members of the fifteen-member body.209  China and Russia, the 
                                                                                                           
prosecution for crimes against humanity).  Not coincidentally, just days before the 
Thailand meetings, the Myanmar government declared the BLC an “unlawful association,” 
claiming that it was “hurtful to the rule of law in the Union of Myanmar, stability of the 
state and community peace.”  Myanmar Junta Declares Lawyers Council Unlawful, 
MYANMA THADIN, May 1, 2009, http://www.myanmathadin.com/news/human-rights/268-
myanmar-junta-declares-lawyers-council-unlawful.html.  The so-called “immunity 
provision” in Myanmar’s constitution provides that “[n]o proceeding shall be instituted 
against the said Councils or any member thereof or any member of the Government, in 
respect of any act done in the execution of their respective duties.”  MYANMAR CONST. ch. 
XIV § 445. 
207 For a partial list, see Criminal Accountability: Support the Call for a Commission of 
Inquiry on Crimes in Burma!: Updates, UNSCBURMA.ORG (Mar. 10, 2011), 
http://www.unscburma.org/Crimes%20in%20Burma/ICC/Updates.php?Submit=Updates.  
The website lists—among others supporting a Commission of Inquiry on Myanmar—the 
following individuals, organizations, and associations:  the International Burmese Monks 
Organization, sixty British members of Parliament, President of East Timor and Nobel 
Laureate José Ramos-Horta, Thai Member of Parliament and ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary 
Myanmar Caucus President Kraisak Choonhavan, former U.N. Special Rapporteurs on the 
Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro and Yozo Yokota, fifty-five 
members of the U.S. House of Representatives, former U.S. First Lady Laura Bush, 
fourteen Nobel Laureates, the U.S. Campaign for Burma, 442 members of parliament from 
twenty-nine countries, the U.K. Conservative Party’s Human Rights Commission, 
UNISON (the U.K.’s second-largest trade union), current U.N. Special Rapporteur on the 
Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar Tomás Ojea Quintana, the Karen National Union, 
the European Karen Network, the Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (ALTSEAN–
Burma), the International Trade Union Confederation, thirty-seven Karen organizations 
(representing the Karen ethnic nationality of Myanmar), the Nobel Women’s Initiative, 
sixty-four women’s organizations from around the world, and thirty-two U.S. senators.  
See also US Civil Society Urges More Myanmar Pressure, BRUNEI TIMES, July 8, 2011, 
http://www.bt.com.bn/news-asia/2011/07/08/us-civil-society-urges-more-myanmar-
pressure (reporting that twenty-one U.S. civil society groups, including the AFL-CIO and 
the Foreign Policy Initiative, joined together to pressure U.S. President Barack Obama to 
provide support to a U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Myanmar crimes). 
208 Views differ on whether cooperation from the Myanmar government would also be 
essential. Compare Wilson, supra note 180, at 10 (arguing that without government 
cooperation, a commission of inquiry “would have little prospect of being held or of 
achieving useful outcomes”), with Burma: Q&A on an International Commission of 
Inquiry, supra note 5 (explaining the rationale behind calls by Human Rights Watch for a 
U.N. commission of inquiry on violations of human rights and international humanitarian 
law in Myanmar, and contending that a lack of government cooperation “would not present 
insurmountable challenges to conducting a valuable and needed inquiry”). 
209 It is unclear whether these countries would continue to support a Commission of 
Inquiry today.  See, e.g., Press Availability in Rangoon, Burma, supra note 28, noting 
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other two permanent members, have come out against such a move.  
China has forcefully lobbied high-level United Nations, Asian, and 
European officials, arguing that a Commission of Inquiry could undermine 
Myanmar’s transition to democracy, and called such a commission 
“dangerous and counterproductive” in a confidential meeting.210 
 But observers of China should not be surprised.  China repeatedly 
supported Sudan publicly:  before, on the day of, and after its referral to 
the ICC.  China’s public statements seemed to have little to do with its 
ultimate decision to allow Sudan to be referred.  More relevant to China’s 
decisions are the economic and political interests that determine its foreign 
policy, and it is to those interests that we now turn. 
VI. CHINA’S ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH SUDAN 
In analyzing China’s economic relationships with Sudan and 
Myanmar, this article aims to make three main points.  First, China buys 
important commodities from Sudan and Myanmar, particularly petroleum 
and other natural resources, but its reliance on those countries—viewed as 
a percentage of overall trade—is miniscule compared to Sudan’s and 
Myanmar’s dependence on China.  The economic power in the 
relationships is so heavily weighted in China’s favor that Sudan and 
Myanmar are simply unable to credibly threaten China’s economic well-
being without completely undermining their own economies and thus their 
ruling parties’ political power.  Conversely, an angered China in a mood 
to retaliate could quickly cause economic crises in Sudan or Myanmar 
with negligible effect on its own economy.  Second, China’s imports from 
Sudan, in particular its energy imports, are appreciably larger than China’s 
imports from Myanmar.  Thus, it follows that China would be even less 
threatened, from an economic perspective, by Myanmar’s negative 
reaction to an ICC referral than it ought to have been with Sudan.  Third, 
and perhaps most importantly, China’s economic relationship with Sudan 
appears not to have been adversely affected by the 2005 referral of Sudan 
to the ICC.  Oil imports thereafter continued to increase while overall 
trade, although at times surging and dropping, remained healthy.211  There 
is little reason to believe, therefore, that a Chinese abstention on the 
creation of a Commission of Inquiry or on a referral of Myanmar to the 
ICC would harm China’s economic interests. 
                                                                                                           
comments on the part of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, reflecting a newfound 
willingness to consider accepting Myanmar domestic accountability mechanisms. 
210  Dan Withers, China Sabotaging UN War Crimes Probe, DEMOCRATIC VOICE OF 
BURMA, Oct. 26, 2010, http://www.dvb.no/news/china-sabotaging-un-war-crimes-
probe/12420. 
211 See tables 1–3, infra Parts VI and VII. 
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It is no exaggeration to say that China is the world’s growing 
economic giant.  Measured by gross domestic product, China overtook 
Japan to become the world’s second-largest economy during the second 
quarter of 2010,212 and it is on course to becoming the world’s largest 
economy by 2020.213  From 1989 to 2010, China’s average annual GDP 
growth was a stunning 9.3%.214  In comparison, the U.S. growth rate from 
1948 to 2011 was a mere 3.25%. 215   From 2000 to 2009, China’s 
worldwide exports rose from USD $249 billion to $1.201 trillion, while its 
imports rose from USD $225 billion to $1.005 trillion.216 
 China’s dramatic growth has resulted in an almost insatiable 
hunger for energy.  Between 2000 and 2005, its energy consumption rose 
over 78%.217  China is the world’s largest producer and consumer of 
coal,218 and it is the second-largest consumer of oil, behind only the 
United States.219  Understandably, China’s astonishing growth has had the 
result of steadily increasing China’s dependence on foreign oil.  In 2003, it 
became the world’s second-largest oil importer.220  According to forecasts 
by the International Energy Agency, China’s ratio of imported to total 
consumed oil was expected to hit 61% by 2010 and 76.9% by 2020, and 
its domestic production is expected to be stagnant.221  Directly related to 
China’s need for oil is its growing demand for cars:  it has been estimated 
that China’s total number of cars will increase twentyfold between 2002 
and 2030, to 390 million.222 
                                                
212 China Overtakes Japan as World’s Second-Biggest Economy, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug. 
16, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-16/china-economy-passes-japan-s-in-
second-quarter-capping-three-decade-rise.html. 
213 Simon Kennedy, G-7 Will Be Eclipsed by E-7 by 2020 as China Surges, PwC Says, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 21, 2010, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=awJGPSXwf4DE. 
214  China GDP Growth Rate, TRADING ECON., available at 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/gdp-growth. 
215  United States GDP Annual Growth Rate, TRADING ECON., available at 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/gdp-growth-annual. 
216  US-China Trade Statistics and China’s World Trade Statistics, U.S.-CHINA BUS. 
COUNCIL, http://www.uschina.org/statistics/tradetable.html (last visited July 25, 2012).  All 
dollar amounts in this article are cited in U.S. dollars. 
217 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 120, at 1. 
218  Country Analysis Briefs: China, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=CH (last updated Oct. 16, 2011). 
219 Id. 
220 Zhang Jianxin, Oil Security Reshapes China’s Foreign Policy 1 (Hong Kong U. of Sci. 
and Tech. Ctr. on China’s Transnational Relations, Working Paper No. 9, 2006), available 
at http://www.marshallfoundation.org/documents/ChinaForeignPolicyEnergy.pdf. 
221 Id. at 5; see also HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 120, at ii (stating that, as of 2008, 
China needed 6.6 million barrels of oil per day). 
222 Joyce Dargay et al., Vehicle Ownership and Income Growth, Worldwide: 1960–2030, 
ENERGY J., Oct. 2007, at 143, 168; see also Pablo Bustelo, China and Oil in the Asian 
Pacific Region, NEW ENGLAND J. PUB. POL’Y, July 2007, at 171, 172, available at 
http://www.ucm.es/info/eid/pb/Bustelo07nejpp%20-%20Pub.pdf (“China could increase its 
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 Recalling that China’s leaders believe that domestic political 
stability—and survival of the ruling party—can only be preserved through 
continued economic growth, as China’s domestic energy resources have 
declined, it is no surprise that it has increasingly looked abroad for natural 
resources to sustain its growth.  As a result, trade between Africa and 
China has grown dramatically.223  In 2009, China surpassed the United 
States as Africa’s top trading partner,224 with trade exceeding USD $100 
billion per annum.225 
 Sudan is China’s third-largest African trading partner.226  The 
1990s saw a strengthening of their economic relationship, primarily due to 
international isolation of Sudan because of its ties to terrorism, and 
China’s search for unexploited oil opportunities.227  Oil is the basis of the 
Sudan-China trade.  Although China’s oil interests in Africa are still 
relatively minor compared to the investments of international oil 
companies, China’s involvement in Sudan is an exception.228  Over 60% 
of Sudan’s oil is sold to China, comprising more than 6% of China’s 
imported oil.229  Nine out of ten shipped barrels of Sudanese oil are 
destined for China.230  In 2010, fuel and mining products made up 88% of 
Sudan’s merchandise exports, with China receiving nearly 65% of all 
                                                                                                           
oil consumption by an average of about 4.5% per year over the next two decades, more 
than doubling the same figure for the world as a whole and more than quadrupling the 
consumption increases forecast for developed western countries.”). 
223  Jian-Ye Wang & Abdoulaye Bio-Tchané, Africa’s Burgeoning Ties with China: 
Maximizing the Benefits of China’s Increasing Economic Engagement with Africa, FIN. & 
DEV., Mar. 2008, at 44, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2008/03/pdf/wang.pdf (describing burgeoning 
trade between the two regions). 
224  South Africa: China Now Top Trading Partner, AFR. PRESS INT’L, Oct. 1, 2009, 
http://africanpress.wordpress.com/2009/10/01/south-africa-china-now-top-trading-partner. 
225 Ed Cropley & Ben Hirschler, China Overtakes US as Africa’s Top Trading Partner, 
BUS. DAILY, Jan. 26, 2010, http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate%20News/-
/539550/850122/-/item/1/-/8r3t1p/-/index.html. 
226  Denine Walters, Sino-Sudanese Relations: The Importance of Oil and the 2011 
Referendum, CONSULTANCY AFR. INTELLIGENCE, Apr. 30, 2010, 
http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=389:
sino-sudanese-relations-the-importance-of-oil-and-the-2011-referendum&catid=58:asia-
dimension-discussion-papers&Itemid=264. 
227 Daniel Large, Arms, Oil and Darfur—The Evolution of Relations Between China and 
Sudan, 7 SUDAN ISSUE BRIEF 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-SIB-7-Arms.pdf; Walters, supra note 
226; see also Jeffrey Gettleman, Far Away from Darfur’s Agony, Khartoum Is Booming, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/23/world/africa/23iht-
web.1024sudan.3262080.html?_r=1 (reporting that foreign direct investment in Sudan 
increased from USD $128 million in 2000 to USD $2.6 billion in 2008). 
228 Erica S. Downs, The Fact and Fiction of Sino-African Energy Relations, CHINA SEC. 
(Summer 2007), at 42, 44; see also Zhang, supra note 220, at 9 (reporting that, in 2004, 
45% of China’s imported oil came from the Middle East, while 28.7% came from Africa). 
229 Walters, supra note 226. 
230 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 120, at i. 
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exported merchandise; the second-highest destination was the United Arab 
Emirates, at 10.5%.231 
 China also controls almost all of Sudan’s potential oil.232  State-
owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China’s largest 
producer and supplier of crude oil and natural gas, 233  is the largest 
shareholder of the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company, Sudan’s 
largest oil company, owning 40% of its stock.234  Meanwhile, China has 
been Sudan’s principal partner in developing the capacity to transport and 
extract oil,235 and Chinese companies have dominated the construction of 
Sudan’s energy infrastructure, including pipelines, marine terminals, and 
refineries: 
 
In short, Sudan’s oil development has, by and large, been 
a Chinese production.  Beijing’s companies pump oil 
from numerous key fields, which then courses through 
Chinese-made pipelines to Chinese-made storage tanks to 
await a voyage to buyers, most of them Chinese.236 
 
The following chart (Table 1) illustrates how Sudan’s dramatic increase in 
oil exports, before and shortly after the ICC referral, was almost 
exclusively fuelled by China’s thirst for petroleum. 
Table 1. Sudanese Oil Exports, in Millions of USD237 
 
As China and Sudan’s economic ties continue to develop, each 
country has come to rely increasingly on the other.  However, while it is 
                                                
231  Trade Profile—Sudan, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=S
D (last updated April 2012). 
232 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 120, at i. 
233  China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), PETRO ENERGY E&P, 
http://www.petroenergy-ep.com/cnpc.htm (last visited July 25, 2012). 
234 Ian Taylor, China’s Oil Diplomacy in Africa, 82 INT’L AFFAIRS 937, 939 (2006). 
235 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 120, at ii. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. at 4. 
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clear that Sudan’s oil is important to China, China has a number of other 
major petroleum investments around the world.  Analysts predict that the 
Middle East will supply 70% of China’s oil imports in 2025, twice the 
2005 figure.238  China’s trade with Sudan is just one small piece in this 
enormous economic puzzle.  Sudan, in contrast, is almost cripplingly 
dependent on China.  China is Sudan’s primary political, economic, and 
military partner.239  Their ties have led to a relationship in which “China’s 
support dominates the country’s economy.”240   80% of the Sudanese 
government’s revenues come from oil, and over 60% of that oil is sold to 
China.241  China is Sudan’s largest trading partner, purchasing 71% of its 
total exports in 2007242 and 65% in 2009.243 
 Economic ties and the imbalance in power between the two 
countries were almost certainly important considerations for China when 
determining whether to abstain from the Sudanese referral.  In Part VII we 
look at how China would make a similar calculation with respect to 
Myanmar. 
VII. CHINA’S ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP WITH MYANMAR 
Like Sudan, Myanmar is an important Chinese ally.  Since 1988, 
when the Myanmar military government’s crackdown on democratic 
demonstrations isolated it from the West, the country’s political, 
diplomatic, security, and economic ties with China have strengthened.244 
 China’s roots are planted deeply in Myanmar’s economy.  Heavily 
invested in infrastructure, Chinese companies have constructed numerous 
hydropower plants, including a USD $1 billion project on Myanmar’s 
Salween River,245 and a thermal power station, accounting for around one 
                                                
238 Bustelo, supra note 222, at 172. 
239 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ICC CHARGES IN DARFUR AND THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 3 
(2008), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/080508-cah-
genocide-charges-impact-on-arms-sales.pdf. 
240 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 120, at 10.  But see Li Anshan, China and Africa: 
Policy and Challenges, CHINA SEC. (Summer 2007), at 69 (asserting that China is more 
dependent on Africa than vice versa). 
241 Walters, supra note 226. 
242 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, ICC CHARGES IN DARFUR AND THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION, 
supra note 239, at 3. 
243 See U.N. COMMODITY TRADE STATISTICS DATABASE, http://comtrade.un.org/db/ (last 
visited July 25, 2012) (reporting that in 2009, Sudan’s total exports to the world 
approximated USD $9.0 billion, while its exports to China approximated USD $5.9 billion). 
244 Toshihiro Kudo, Myanmar’s Economic Relations with China: Can China Support the 
Myanmar Economy?, at 4 (Inst. of Dev. Economies, Discussion Paper No. 66, July 2006), 
available at http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Dp/pdf/066.pdf. 
245 Larry Jagan, China: The Junta’s Best Friend, MYANMAR ETHNIC ROHINGYAS HUMAN 
RIGHTS ORG. MALAYSIA (MEHROM), Aug. 12, 2011, available at 
http://merhrom.wordpress.com/2008/08/12/china-the-junta%E2%80%99s-best-friend. 
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third of Myanmar’s total energy generation capacity. 246   China also 
provides a significant amount of economic assistance in the form of 
interest-free loans.247 
 As with Sudan, a large part of China’s economic interest in 
Myanmar revolves around Myanmar’s natural resources.  Myanmar has 
the fastest-growing oil and gas industry in Southeast Asia, with natural gas 
its largest source of export revenue.248  In exchange for China’s help, 
Myanmar grants it privileges regarding oil and gas rights.249  China’s 
agreement to USD $300 million in trade deals and financial assistance in 
2005 was crucial in securing Myanmar’s acquiescence for parallel 
pipelines transporting natural gas from Myanmar and oil from Africa and 
the Middle East.250 
 That gas pipeline is critical for China to meet its growing need for 
natural gas:  from 2000 to 2008, China’s natural gas consumption more 
than tripled, rising at a double-digit rate.251  In 2008, China imported 4% 
of its natural gas; predictions are that by 2030 it will be importing between 
54% and 65%.252  And the oil pipeline has both economic and strategic 
benefits for China.253  It is reportedly capable of reducing China’s reliance 
on the Malacca Strait, which runs between Malaysia and Indonesia, by one 
third.254  Nearly 80% of China’s imported oil passes through the Strait.255  
Fees that Myanmar will collect for delivering oil will likely reach USD 
$14 million per year.256  Over thirty years, the pipelines should yield USD 
                                                
246 Kudo, supra note 244, at 13–14. 
247 Id. at 15; see also Jagan, supra note 245 (reporting that in January 2003, China supplied 
USD $200 million in financial assistance to Myanmar, and in June 2006 provided a further 
loan of USD $200 million). 
248 Matthew F. Smith & Naing Htoo, Energy Security: Security for Whom?, 11 YALE HUM. 
RTS. & DEV. L.J. 217, 221 (2008). 
249 Kudo, supra note 244, at 15. 
250 See Dan Blumenthal, Concerns with Respect to China’s Energy Policy, in CHINA’S 
ENERGY STRATEGY: THE IMPACT ON BEIJING’S MARITIME POLICIES 418, 425 (Gabriel 
Collins et al. eds., 2008); see also Bo Kong, The Geopolitics of the Myanmar–China Oil 
and Gas Pipelines, in PIPELINE POLITICS IN ASIA: THE INTERSECTION OF DEMAND, ENERGY 
MARKETS, AND SUPPLY ROUTES 55, 57 (2010) (explaining that the pipeline, officially 
agreed to in 2009, is 690 miles long, and designed to transport 440,000 barrels of oil per 
day from the Middle East and Africa, and that a parallel, 1,123-mile-long pipeline will 
carry 12 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year from the Bay of Bengal). 
251 Bo Kong, supra note 250, at 61. 
252 Id. at 60–61. 
253 Blumenthal, supra note 250, at 426. 
254 INT’L CRISIS GRP., CHINA’S MYANMAR DILEMMA, supra note 206, at 20. 
255 Id.  But see Michael Lelyveld, Mideast Oil Drives China Disputes, RADIO FREE ASIA, 
July 18, 2011, http://www.rfa.org/english/energy_watch/oil-07182011103202.html 
(estimating the amount of China’s oil shipments passing through the Malacca Straits in 
2011 at about 30% of China’s total oil demand). 
256 Bo Kong, supra note 250, at 60. 
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$1 billion or more for Myanmar, equal on an annual basis to one-third of 
its existing foreign exchange reserves.257 
 Looking at overall trade between the countries, it is evident that 
China is vital to the success of Myanmar and its government.  Some even 
argue that the Myanmar military regime would not have survived without 
China’s aid.258  Border trade with China has been called the “lifeline” of 
Myanmar’s economy.259  In 1988, total trade between the two nations was 
USD $9.51 million, by 2000 it had grown to USD $621.26 million,260 and 
by 2010 it had reached USD $4.44 billion.261  As a result of an imbalance 
in production of manufactured goods, Myanmar’s lack of domestic capital, 
and over-bureaucratization, Myanmar has consistently faced significant 
trade deficits with China.262  Myanmar’s exports to China increased by 1.3 
times from 1988 to 2003, but its imports increased by 7.1 times.263 
 Despite strengthening economic ties between China and Myanmar, 
trade between the countries remains a tiny percentage of China’s overall 
trade.  Trade from Yunnan Province, bordering Myanmar, constituted 
73% of Myanmar’s overall border trade, yet the amount of goods flowing 
through Yunnan’s capital was less than 1% of China’s overall trade.264  
Additionally, despite the well-publicized oil trade between the nations, 
Myanmar is not considered a major energy supplier to China,265 and on a 
global scale its proven oil reserves are “quite small.”266  In 1994, 56% of 
China’s imported oil came from the Asia-Pacific region, but by 2001 it 
was only 15%.267  In 2011, about 80% of China’s oil came from the 
Middle East and Africa, and the proportion from those regions was 
expected to rise.268  Furthermore, the pipeline to bring crude oil from the 
Middle East through Myanmar, despite its geopolitical importance, will 
                                                
257 Id. 
258 See, e.g., INT’L CRISIS GRP., CHINA’S MYANMAR DILEMMA, supra note 206, at 1; Zou 
Keyuan, China’s Possible Role in Myanmar’s National Reconciliation, 17 COPENHAGEN J. 
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have only a marginal impact on China’s overall energy security, delivering 
only 11% of China’s current oil imports.269  That amount is not expected 
to increase significantly:  78% of China’s oil imports in 2015 and 89% in 
2030 are expected to still come from maritime transport.270  Thus, while 
Myanmar is clearly a key trade partner for China, as China’s economy 
grows and it spreads its trade further and further abroad, Myanmar’s 
importance to it will continue to wane. 
 How does China’s trade with Myanmar compare to its trade with 
Sudan?  In 2010, Sudan was ranked the 28th-largest exporter of goods to 
China, whereas Myanmar was not in the top fifty.271  However, Myanmar 
topped Sudan in importing Chinese goods, where Myanmar was 40th, at 
0.2%, and Sudan was not in the top fifty.272  In overall trade with China, 
Sudan ranked 34th, and Myanmar 46th.273  But more significant than these 
rankings are the relative amounts of trade shown by the following two 
tables. 
Table 2. Imports to the P.R.C. (excluding Hong Kong and 
Macao) from Sudan and Myanmar, 2000–2010, in Millions of 
USD274 
 
                                                
269 Bo Kong, supra note 250, at 63. 
270 Id. 
271  DG TRADE, CHINA: EU BILATERAL TRADE AND TRADE WITH THE WORLD (2012), 
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113366.pdf.  
These statistics consider the European Union as one body.  If European nations had been 
separated, Sudan and Myanmar would have ranked lower. 
272 Id. 
273 Id. 
274 U.N. COMMODITY TRADE STATISTICS DATABASE, supra note 243.  In this article, import 
data, rather than export data, have been used as much as possible because they are usually 
recorded more accurately.  See Azita Amjadi et al., User’s Manual, WORLD INTEGRATED 
TRADE SOLUTION 38, Jan. 2011, available at 
http://wits.worldbank.org/data/public/WITS_User_Manual.pdf (noting that imports are 
recorded more accurately because they generate tariff revenues).  In this chart, for 
example, imports from China’s records, rather than exports from Sudan’s and Myanmar’s 
records, were used.  All data are based on the Harmonized Commodity Description and 
Coding System. 
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Table 3. Exports from the P.R.C. (excluding Hong Kong and 
Macao) to Sudan and Myanmar, 2000–2010, in Millions of 
USD275 
 
 
Table 2 demonstrates that Sudan’s exports to China dwarf 
Myanmar’s.  This is a critical difference that supports the argument that 
China would show less compunction in referring Myanmar to the ICC 
than it showed Sudan.  In imports, the countries remained close for most 
of the 2000s, with Myanmar taking a measurable lead in 2010.  On an 
aggregate basis, Myanmar is apparently a more valuable import partner 
than Sudan, although it is surprising how close the numbers are given 
Sudan’s geographical distance from China. 
 Moving from a comparison between the two countries to a 
comparison of them with the rest of the world, it becomes clear that both 
have little economic leverage.  In 2010, China’s imports from Myanmar 
were 0.07% of China’s total imports, less than one tenth of one percent.276  
Imports from Sudan were 0.48% of China’s total.277  China’s exports to 
Myanmar in the same year were 0.22% of China’s total exports, while 
exports to Sudan were 0.12%.278 
                                                
275 U.N. COMMODITY TRADE STATISTICS DATABASE, supra note 243.  As noted supra in 
note 274, import statistics are generally more reliable than export data.  In the case of 
imports from China to Myanmar, however, import data were unavailable for the years 
under study.  Thus, export data from the China reporter were used to show trade from 
China to Myanmar.  To maintain consistency in comparison, export data were also used for 
trade from China to Sudan. 
276 Id.  China’s total imports worldwide in 2010 were worth approximately USD $1.4 
trillion, of which imports from Myanmar totaled approximately USD $966 million. 
277 Id.  Imports to China from Sudan in 2010 were approximately USD $6.7 billion.  This 
number does not account for different types of imports, and some imports like petroleum 
and natural gas—the primary products that Myanmar sells to China—are arguably more 
critical to China than other goods.  Moreover, economics is just one factor of many that 
influence foreign policy decisions.  Nevertheless, the comparative insignificance of 
Myanmar and Sudan within China’s overall trade portfolio is startling. 
278 Id.  China’s total exports worldwide in 2010 were approximately USD $1.6 trillion; of 
that total, exports to Myanmar were approximately USD $3.5 billion, and to Sudan 
approximately USD $2 billion. 
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 In contrast to China’s diversified trade, Myanmar and Sudan are 
almost completely dependent upon China.  In 2010, China was 
Myanmar’s largest import and third-largest export partner, ranking second 
in overall trade only behind Thailand.279  In the same year, China was 
Sudan’s top importer, top exporter, and top overall trade partner.280 
 These economic statistics do not predetermine China’s foreign 
policy decisions, in the Security Council or otherwise.  They nevertheless 
reveal important relationships that must be taken into account when 
predicting Chinese diplomatic decisions.  In the cases of Sudan and 
Myanmar, these statistics show that China enjoys enormous disparities in 
economic leverage and power. 
VIII. CHINA’S POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP WITH SUDAN 
Political and diplomatic relations are less concrete and more 
difficult to compare than economic data, especially with regards to nations 
as secretive as China, Myanmar, and Sudan.  Nevertheless, an 
examination of China’s political relationships similarly reveals that the 
price for China of acting adversely to Sudan and Myanmar is lower than 
one might anticipate.  As international pariahs, Sudan and Myanmar have 
little ability to provide meaningful diplomatic support to China, compared 
to China’s capacity to use its substantial international leverage to protect 
them. 
 For over fifty years, China has considered African countries 
diplomatically important.281  It has had long and positive relations with 
Sudan, built on an established framework of cooperation, including ties 
between political leaders and business elites.282   Historically, China’s 
diplomatic approach to Sudan has been characterized by its support for 
Sudan’s sovereignty, partiality for Sudanese or African mediation 
processes, and opposition to sanctions—particularly petroleum 
sanctions.283  China has been a relatively reliable defender of Sudan on the 
U.N. Security Council.284  In exchange, China receives diplomatic benefits 
such as support in defeating Taiwan’s application for membership in the 
                                                
279 DG TRADE, MYANMAR: EU BILATERAL TRADE AND TRADE WITH THE WORLD 6 (2012), 
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113423.pdf. 
280 DG TRADE, SUDAN: EU BILATERAL TRADE AND TRADE WITH THE WORLD 6 (2012), 
available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/january/tradoc_147395.pdf. 
281 Taylor, supra note 234, at 939. 
282 Large, supra note 227, at 1, 7. 
283 Id. at 7. 
284 Richard W. Williamson, Sudan and the Implications for Responsibility to Protect, 
POL’Y ANALYSIS BRIEF (The Stanley Found., Muscatine, I.A.), Oct. 2009, at 6, available at 
http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/WilliamsonPAB1009.pdf. 
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United Nations 285  and rejection of human rights proposals against 
China.286  Sudan has come to trust China.287 
 China’s political support for Sudan is focused on two areas:  
military cooperation and protection at the United Nations.288  China is 
“Sudan’s primary provider of small arms, a major supplier of advanced 
weapons systems, and Khartoum’s most powerful military partner.”289  It 
uses the weapons trade to increase political power and gain access to 
valuable natural resources.290  Since 2004, China has sold on average 90% 
of Sudan’s small arms.291  Notwithstanding a U.N. ban on arms provision 
and sale in the Darfur region, the United Nations found that most small 
arms used in the Darfur conflict were manufactured in China. 292  
Reportedly, many of these weapons found their way to the Janjaweed 
militias. 293   Military aircraft, including fighter jets and transport 
helicopters, were imported from China throughout the 1990s.294  In sum, 
China has become Sudan’s “military mentor.”295 
 China’s military relationship with Sudan has had myriad benefits 
for China, strengthening political ties and helping China to obtain Sudan’s 
political support when needed.  It has also incentivized Sudan to continue 
to give China preferences in the oil trade, helped China recoup some of its 
expenditures on petroleum, provided an outlet for outdated weaponry no 
                                                
285 China Thanks Africans for Defeating Taiwan’s Bid to Join UN, SUDAN TRIB., Sept. 27, 
2007, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?page=imprimable&id_article=23973. 
286 Li, supra note 240, at 75. 
287 Id. at 77. 
288 J.S. Kohli, The Dragon on Safari: China’s Africa Policy, INST. FOR PEACE & CONFLICT 
STUD. (Special Report No. 86, Oct. 2009), at 6, available at 
http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR86-China-Kohli-Final.pdf. 
289 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 120, at 15. 
290  See Christopher Alessi & Stephanie Hanson, Expanding China-Africa Oil Ties, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/publication/9557/china_africa_and_oil.html 
(Feb. 8, 2012); Large, supra note 227, at 5; RICHARD F. GRIMMET, CONG. RES. SERVICE, 
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1999–2006, (2007), at 12, available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34187_20070926.pdf; see also Walters, supra note 226 
(tracing the moment China became Sudan’s top provider to 1996). 
291 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 120, at ii. 
292 Taylor, supra note 234, at 950. 
293 William D. Hartung, Deadly Traffic: China’s Arms Trade with the Sudan, ARMS & SEC. 
INITIATIVE POL’Y BRIEF (New Am. Found., D.C.), Aug. 2008, at 2, available at 
http://www.newamerica.net/files/nafmigration/080606PBChinaArmsTrade.pdf. 
294 Large, supra note 227, at 5. 
295 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 120, at i; see also Hilary Andersson, China ‘Is 
Fuelling War in Darfur’, BBC NEWS, July 13, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7503428.stm (reporting on Sudanese weapons that had been 
traced to China); China Ups Military Aid to Sudan Despite Human Rights Issues, 
WORLDTRIBUNE.COM, Apr. 6, 2007, 
http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2007/ea_china_04_05.html 
(reporting increased military cooperation between China and Sudan). 
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longer needed by the Chinese military, and armed the security forces 
tasked with protecting China’s oil fields and facilities in Sudan.296 
 The crisis in Darfur made the China-Sudan relationship a subject 
of international scrutiny, consequently compelling China to play a more 
active role in Sudanese politics than it might otherwise have chosen.297  In 
Darfur, China was caught between defending a marginalized ally and 
improving its international image: 
 
Darfur also placed Beijing [in] a dilemma between two 
diverging aspects of its new diplomatic standards.  On the 
one side is the traditional emphasis on sovereignty and 
non-interference, principles that proved to be lucrative to 
carve out economic deals in Sudan and elsewhere in 
Africa. . . . On the other side we find constructive 
engagement . . . necessary to maintain good relations with 
other world powers and to play a role in multilateral 
organisations.298 
 
 The Darfur situation, in fact, illustrates the “breaking down” of 
China’s strict adherence to non-interference. 299 While China officially 
continues to propound its historical respect for sovereignty, increasing—
and negative—media attention, combined with a realization by China that 
its desire for international prestige depends to some degree on its active 
participation in world affairs, have led it to be more willing than ever to 
use its position to influence Sudan.300 
 As an illustration of this shift to the center, China has continued to 
give only qualified support for Sudan at the United Nations.  For instance, 
in connection with the Security Council resolution condemning the 
violence in Darfur and declaring the situation a threat to international 
peace and security, China’s veto threat resulted in the removal of language 
approving economic sanctions.301  Nonetheless, in abstaining from the 
final vote, China allowed the resolution to pass.302  Later in 2004, the issue 
of sanctions was raised again, but disappeared due to Chinese 
objections.303  Yet China still permitted the passage of Resolution 1564, 
                                                
296 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 120, at 15–16. 
297 Large, supra note 227, at 7. 
298 Holslag, supra note 66, at 1. 
299 Marcus Power & Giles Mohan, The Geopolitics of China’s Engagement with African 
Development (Open U. POLIS Dep’t of Politics & Int’l Stud. & BISA Afr. & Int’l Stud. 
Working Grp.-Sponsored Workshop, July 9, 2008), at 18, available at 
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300 Large, supra note 227, at 1. 
301 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 120, at iii. 
302 S.C. Res. 1556, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1556 (July 30, 2004). 
303 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 120, at iii. 
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which included the request for a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the 
Darfur situation.304  These instances exemplify China’s strong stance in 
protecting its economic interests by refusing to endorse sanctions, while 
still permitting crucial censure of an ally and eventual ICC referral.305  As 
an indication of Sudan’s subservience to China, Sudanese President al-
Bashir praised China and the other countries that abstained, saying they 
were Sudan’s “true friends”—despite China’s refusal to use its veto.306 
 At the U.N. Commission of Human Rights, and at its successor 
agency, the U.N. Human Rights Council, China has followed a similar 
pattern.  In 2006, China defended Sudan following a report on human 
rights abuses by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human 
rights in the Sudan.307  That same year, China helped pass a Human Rights 
Council resolution calling for the cessation of human rights violations in 
Darfur, but only after successfully voting against and helping to remove 
language recognizing Sudan’s responsibility to protect against human 
rights abuses and language recognizing the importance of criminal 
accountability.308  China’s policy of combining support with criticism 
continued when it welcomed a mission to Darfur but then later objected to 
the mission’s report.309  While criticism of China is certainly justified 
when it votes against language condemning its abusive allies, it is equally 
important to recognize how rarely China actually uses its veto power. 
 China’s diplomatic position regarding the presence of U.N. 
peacekeeping troops in Darfur further reflected the delicate balance 
between supporting its economic and political ally and simultaneously 
maintaining international credibility and prestige.  After the Darfur Peace 
Agreement was signed in May 2006, the Sudanese government, ostensibly 
worried about Western imperialism, strongly opposed a peacekeeping 
force. 310   After the African Union came out in support of troops, 
conditioned on their acceptance by Sudan, China also announced its 
                                                
304 Id. 
305 But see id. (interpreting China’s abstentions as signs of disapproval and rejection, rather 
than as tacit approvals). 
306 Id. 
307 Id. at 18–19. 
308 Id. at 19. 
309 Id. 
310 Id. at 20; see also Holslag, supra note 66, at 2–3.  China had multiple reasons to support 
U.N. troops in Sudan, and also multiple reasons to oppose them, or at least to condition 
their presence on acceptance by the Sudanese government.  On one hand, violence put 
China’s economic interests at risk, and risked triggering unilateral Western action that 
could weaken China’s strategic position in the country.  Furthermore, refusing the African 
Union’s request for U.N. troops would have jeopardized China’s relations with other 
African countries, and obstruction of a troop deployment could have threatened China’s 
relationship with Sudan’s neighbor Chad, which supported deployment of troops.  On the 
other hand, China had an interest in maintaining a good relationship with Sudan, in 
preventing chaos from erupting as a result of the imposition of unwelcome forces, and in 
cooperating in devising a political solution to the problem. 
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willingness to support the force.311  China’s suggestion that the Sudanese 
government’s consent be required was rejected, although the final 
resolution “invited” consent.312  Abstaining from the vote on Resolution 
1706, China even accepted that U.N. troops could use force.313 
 With Sudan continuing to object, and international pressure 
accumulating, in August and September 2006, Chinese diplomats began 
expressing “displeasure” and sending a “strong message” that Sudan 
should accept the peacekeepers.314  In February 2007, China’s president 
visited Sudan, where he wrote off millions of dollars worth of debt, and 
gave a multi-million-dollar interest-free loan to al-Bashir for a new 
presidential palace.315  In March 2007, China applied additional pressure 
by removing Sudan from its list of preferred trade partners, thereby 
eliminating special incentives for Chinese businesses investing there.316  In 
April 2007, China’s assistant foreign minister continued to both prod and 
support Sudan, calling for increased Sudanese flexibility, while also 
opposing sanctions.317  Finally, China’s ambassador to the United Nations 
convinced Sudan to accept a hybrid United Nations and African Union 
force.318  China quickly took credit for the breakthrough, claiming that 
China’s diplomatic work was “inseparable” from Sudan’s acceptance of 
the peacekeepers.319  The efforts received praise from abroad.320 
                                                
311 HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 120, at 20. 
312 Wu, supra note 64, at 84; see also S.C. Res. 1706, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 
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from the list was more a reflection of changes in commercial priorities than a lever of 
pressure). 
317 Large, supra note 227, at 7. 
318 Robert F. Worth, Sudan Says it Will Accept U.N.-African Peace Force in Darfur, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2006, 
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320 See Holslag, supra note 66, at 8; John D. Negroponte & Jendayi Frazer, Briefing on 
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 Critics of China’s relationship with Sudan have suggested that 
China has been an inflexibly staunch supporter of Sudan at the United 
Nations.  Human Rights First argues:  “[a]t almost every turn, 
international efforts to protest and end the suffering in Darfur have 
collided with China’s willingness to stand up for Khartoum.  China has 
consistently deflected pressure, emboldened its obstructionism and, of 
course, protected the two nations’ myriad deals and connections.”321  Yet 
China’s voting record reflects a more nuanced approach.  Despite watering 
down language, threatening vetoes, and blocking sanctions, between 2001 
and 2007, on twenty-two Security Council resolutions on Sudan, China 
never used its veto power, abstained eight times, and voted in favor 
fourteen times. 322   Thus, while China clearly remained a reluctant 
participant in Security Council action in Sudan, when push came to shove, 
it did not wholeheartedly support its ally.  Furthermore, in a move that 
“would have been unimaginable in the past,” China’s special envoy to 
Darfur met with rebel leaders, directly contravening China’s historical 
policy of never dealing directly with anti-government leaders out of 
respect for national sovereignty.323  Darfur forced China to balance its 
traditional principles and economic interests with its desire for long term 
stability and its need to satisfy international expectations. 324   This 
balancing of interests explains, to some degree, China’s abstentions: 
 
China often runs into a dilemma between international 
justice and overseas interests. . . .  Diplomatically, China 
is neither willing to directly conflict with the western 
countries who are often under the excuse for safeguarding 
human rights nor able to hold a clear position against the 
Sudanese government.  Here, the abstaining becomes a 
reluctant but necessary option.325 
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 The Sudanese government was reportedly quite angered about 
China’s 2005 abstention on its ICC referral.326  Yet both nations appear to 
have treated it as a mere blip in a long history of close relations.  High-
level meetings between military officials from the two countries continued 
between 2005 and 2007, 327  the years when the referral would have 
affected relations most.  Since then, the Chinese Embassy in the United 
Kingdom has continued to designate Sudan publicly as a close ally.328  In 
2008, al-Bashir said that following the withdrawal of many multinational 
oil companies, Sudan was able to “turn to the East [Asia], and the East has 
never let us down.”329  In fact, according to Human Rights First, “[t]he 
relationship between the two governments has grown stronger while the 
violence in Darfur continues.”330 
 The relationship remains strong despite China’s refusal to 
unconditionally support Sudan because although on the surface the two 
nations appear to treat each other as equals, their political alliance is 
characterized by the same unequal division of power that is evident in 
their economic relationship.  Though Sudan may be able to assist China in 
some instances, China is “widely recognized as critical to Khartoum’s . . .  
international relations.”331  A statement by the Chinese special envoy on 
Darfur is revealing:  “[Sudan is] just like a child.  If you judge him to be a 
bad child, when he does something good you should give him a little 
encouragement and say some nice things.”332 
 There are clearly some lessons to be learned from China’s 
political relationship with Sudan.  First, China objects loudly to what it 
considers violations of national sovereignty, especially when they may 
affect economic relations, but will stray from this position when a larger 
interest, such as its desire to maintain its international image, is at stake.  
Second, China often abstains as a means to placate an ally and the 
international community at the same time.  Third, when an ally is in a 
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position of almost utter economic and diplomatic dependence, the 
potential cost to China of angering that ally is more acceptable. 
IX. CHINA’S POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MYANMAR 
A. Political Relations Between China and Myanmar, 1949–2010 
The factor that weighs most heavily in Myanmar’s favor when 
considering whether China would veto a Commission of Inquiry or ICC 
referral is its geopolitical importance to China.  Unlike Sudan, Myanmar 
lies on China’s border, separating China’s inland provinces from the sea.  
The stability of Myanmar, both political and economic, has direct 
repercussions on China; war, HIV and AIDS, drugs, and other problems 
along the border directly affect Chinese citizens.  Because of its key 
location, Myanmar’s condition influences the stability of the entire 
region’s economic, political, security, and military affairs.  This Section 
(A) addresses the history of the nations’ diplomatic relationship, the 
strength of their military ties, the stability of their border, burgeoning rifts 
in their alliance, and China’s 2007 veto of a Security Council resolution 
critical of Myanmar. 
 Due to its enormous size, geographic proximity, exploding 
population, and economic might, China casts a long shadow over 
Southeast Asian nations,333 which it considers crucial to its interests and 
security.334  Stability in the area is a top Chinese priority.335  China and 
Myanmar’s relationship since the 1990s has been one of wary friendship.  
Border issues, political instability, and Myanmar’s status as an 
international pariah have all strained their relationship.  Nonetheless, 
China has been Myanmar’s most important ally.  It is too soon to say what 
type of relationship China will develop with Myanmar’s new government, 
but in regularly defending Myanmar at the international level, China has 
shown that its interests in political stability and friendly relations with its 
neighbors are just as crucial to it as its economic interests. 
 China and Myanmar’s relationship dates back to A.D. 122.336  
Since the founding of the P.R.C. in 1949, relations have been generally 
stable.337  Ambivalent peaceful co-existence has evolved into strategic 
alignment.338  In 1960, the two countries signed a formal treaty agreeing 
that their relationship would be based on the five “principles of peaceful 
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co-existence” China had articulated as the foundation for relations with 
other nations:  (i) mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; 
(ii) mutual non-aggression; (iii) mutual non-interference in each other’s 
internal affairs; (iv) equality and mutual benefits; and (v) peaceful co-
existence.339  As neighbors, the countries proceeded to sign a number of 
agreements reiterating and expanding on this pledge of cooperation.340  
Friendly visits by high-level officials of both countries have been 
extensive. 341   China and Myanmar have always called each other 
“paukthaw” (“brother”), a word Myanmar reserves only for China.342 
 A turning point in recent China-Myanmar relations came when 
Myanmar was isolated by the West following its refusal to honor the 
results of its 1990 democratic election.343  The economic situation became 
dire, and Myanmar had little choice but to turn to China.344  Since then, 
Myanmar has cultivated close ties with China.345  In 1991, the two nations 
agreed that neither would allow outsiders to impose Western human rights 
values on their domestic affairs.346  In 2000, China reaffirmed its respect 
for Myanmar’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, while Myanmar 
agreed to recognize that Taiwan was part of China.347  In 2004, during a 
visit to China by Myanmar’s prime minister, the countries again 
acknowledged and promised to continue their historical friendship.348In 
June 2011, the countries “upgraded” their relationship, signing a number 
of trade agreements, and reaffirming their mutually beneficial friendship 
and cooperation.349 
 Several features of Myanmar’s location make it of special interest 
to China:  (i) Myanmar lies at an economic and strategic crossroads where 
South Asia, East Asia, and Southeast Asia meet;350 (ii) Myanmar shares its 
longest border with China;351 and (iii) Myanmar controls China’s access to 
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342 Id. at 60; Kudo, supra note 244, at 3. 
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the Indian Ocean.352  China’s policies towards Myanmar reflect its multi-
faceted interest in the country.  China seeks to:  (i) preserve regional 
stability; (ii) continue its economic growth and modernization; (iii) 
maintain peaceful relations with its neighbors; (iv) keep open a trade route 
to Southeast Asia, Bangladesh, and India; and (v) develop its southwestern 
inland provinces.353  To protect its power and access to trade, China has 
been building a string of ports from the South China Sea towards the 
Persian Gulf; several of these are located in Myanmar. 354   China’s 
construction of coastal ports and bases along the Indian Ocean has been 
called the “grand prize” of China’s relationship with Myanmar, due to the 
utility of an increased ability to monitor movements on the Indian 
Ocean.355 
 As with China and Sudan, military ties between China and 
Myanmar have been a key feature of their relationship.356  After 1988, 
Myanmar abandoned its policy—grounded in a position of Cold War 
neutrality—of refusing large weapons deals.357  Instead, it launched an 
ambitious overhaul of its armed forces.358  Since Western countries were 
unwilling to sell it arms, Myanmar became largely reliant upon China.359  
China remains Myanmar’s largest supplier of military weaponry.360  In 
1989, a Myanmar military delegation agreed to a package of military 
expenditures totaling approximately USD $1.4 billion, which included 
helicopters, attack planes, cruise missiles, and tanks.361  As of 2005, China 
had provided USD $1.6 billion in military assistance.362  Aside from 
purely commercial motives, China benefits from the complications that an 
armed Myanmar causes its rival India.363  It also appears that China’s 
access to Myanmar’s Indian Ocean naval bases came in exchange for arms 
assistance.364 
 Despite close ties, the relationship between China and Myanmar 
has been characterized as “a marriage of convenience rather than a love 
match.”365  There are strains originating from both sides.  China’s rise has 
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created an unbalanced alliance.  Before China became a global power, 
Myanmar played an important role in its foreign policy.  But now their 
imbalance in prestige and economic strength makes China critical to 
Myanmar’s foreign policy, while “Myanmar is currently a low priority for 
China.”366  China’s friendship with Myanmar has also become an irritant 
in China’s relationship with the West.367  Tensions also arise because 
Myanmar’s arguable instability and inept government threaten Chinese 
investments.368 
 China is increasingly worried about instability on the 2,192-
kilometer China-Myanmar border.369  Over 95% of heroin used in China 
comes from the Golden Triangle region, much of it funneled through 
Myanmar.370  The border town of Ruili is known as “ground zero” for 
China’s AIDS epidemic; AIDS is reportedly China’s leading cause of 
death related to infectious disease.371  Gambling on the Myanmar side of 
the border is associated with a wide range of illicit activities including 
kidnapping, torture, and murder.372  Most Chinese have little interest in 
Myanmar’s difficulties, simply regarding it as a failed state rich in natural 
resources.373 
 Myanmar, despite its dependence, is also cautious about its 
relationship with its neighbor.374  It has become increasingly wary of 
China’s foreign policy intentions.  Some in the country fear that China 
will use it as a bargaining chip with the United States.375  There are 
indications that China has less sway over the Myanmar government than is 
widely believed:  “[t]he view that China could force political change in 
Myanmar if only it were willing to use its influence is overstated.  Beijing 
can extract certain minor concessions, but they have never led to 
fundamental changes.”376  The mistrust goes both ways.  Myanmar’s 
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military rulers still distrust China for its previous support of the insurgent 
Communist Party of Burma, and for its more recent dealings with ethnic 
groups on the border.377  Myanmar government leaders also fear Chinese 
domination of their country.  Even Chinese officials have observed that 
Myanmar, especially its northern regions, has become a Chinese economic 
colony. 378   To reduce China’s influence, Myanmar has worked on 
improving ties with other neighbors, particularly India.379 
 A test of the Myanmar-China relationship came in September 
2007, when demonstrations led by Myanmar monks against an 
unannounced price hike in fuel led to a violent crackdown by the military.  
China urged restraint both privately and publicly.380   It supported a 
Security Council statement and—after softening it—a U.N. Human Rights 
Council resolution deploring the violence. 381   Urging dialogue and 
democratic progress, China was relieved that the instability brought about 
by the demonstrations ended quickly.382 
 In January 2008, China joined in further criticism when it 
supported a Security Council statement disapproving of the Myanmar 
government’s progress on the release of political prisoners and on genuine 
dialogue with the opposition following the 2007 crackdown. 383   In 
response, less than a month later, the junta announced a timeline for 
ratification of a new constitution and multiparty democratic elections.384 
 In 2008, the relationship was tested again after Cyclone Nargis hit 
Myanmar.  Facing intense international pressure, China convinced the 
regime to accept, and publicly supported, the United Nation’s efforts to 
supply international humanitarian aid. 385   During a December 2008 
meeting between Myanmar’s leader at the time, Than Shwe, and Chinese 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, China urged the regime to do more for its 
people, and said that China would not be able to continue supporting 
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Myanmar indefinitely.386  Yang also criticized Myanmar’s spending on 
non-priority initiatives and the lengthy jail sentences of political 
activists.387 
 In May 2009, China’s support for Myanmar was again at issue 
when the regime extended Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest by eighteen 
months for allegedly allowing an American, John Yettaw, to stay in her 
house after he swam across a lake to visit her.  China reportedly initially 
supported a strong Security Council statement condemning the trial, but 
backtracked after Russia opposed it.388  After sentencing, China expressed 
opposition to a statement deploring the verdict, but agreed to a watered-
down version expressing “serious concern.”389  Privately, Chinese officials 
expressed support for Aung San Suu Kyi’s release, and for dialogue with 
the opposition, so long as stability and respect for the Myanmar 
government’s political process were ensured.390 
 These developments in the China-Myanmar relationship echo 
China’s reactions to Sudan’s problems.  The International Crisis Group 
characterizes China’s approach toward Myanmar’s political problems as 
“value-free,” indicating a willingness to work with whatever government 
is in power.391  In fact, China was the first to welcome the main opposition 
party when it won the 1990 elections. 392   Playing all sides, China 
maintains contact with opposition groups in exile, and, via the provincial 
government of Yunnan, with ethnic groups along the China-Myanmar 
border.393  These relations have strained the goodwill between the two 
governments.394  There is even evidence that weapons used by armed 
opposition groups may unofficially come from the People’s Liberation 
Army and perhaps from Chinese state-owned companies.395  Fighting 
between these groups and the Myanmar military has led to waves of 
refugees crossing the border into China, further exacerbating tensions 
between the two countries.396 
 China’s political ties with Myanmar are undoubtedly strong.  
Nevertheless, China’s continued support of Myanmar has had costs, 
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particularly in degrading China’s global image and diplomatic leverage.397  
Some speculate that China may conclude that international embarrassment 
and criticism are not worth it:  “[w]ithin China there are growing doubts 
over whether it is worthwhile [to jeopardize] important bilateral relations 
with Western countries—especially the U.S.—because of Myanmar.”398  
Regarding a potential Security Council vote on a Commission of Inquiry 
or ICC referral, it is critical to recall that China and Sudan also enjoyed 
strong relations at the time of the Darfur crisis.  Because of its geographic 
proximity to China, however, Myanmar clearly has special strategic 
importance to China that Sudan does not. 
 In January 2007 came what was probably the most significant 
indication that China would treat Myanmar differently from Sudan.  The 
United States sponsored a resolution that would have called upon 
Myanmar’s government to stop military attacks against civilians in ethnic 
regions, release political prisoners, make tangible progress towards 
democracy, end forced labor, and stop the use of rape by its military.399  
China and Russia jointly vetoed the resolution.400  This was China’s first 
Security Council veto since 1973 not related to Taiwan.  China and Russia 
stated that human rights problems were not within the mandate of the 
Security Council unless they threatened regional or international peace 
and security, which the situation in Myanmar did not.401  The vote showed 
that despite China’s increasingly cooperative attitude towards Security 
Council actions and international peacekeeping, it remains willing to 
exercise its veto power to protect its allies and its notion of sovereignty.402  
Yet the veto also had a cost.  China’s image suffered, and it was heavily 
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criticized in the international media.403  China hedged its position slightly 
by having its ambassador to the United Nations and its State Councilor 
both express impatience with Myanmar’s reforms.404   Furthermore, a 
resolution on human rights, political freedoms, and public safety is quite 
different from one relating to criminal charges, for which China has never 
used a veto.405 
B. Political Developments in Myanmar in 2011 and 2012 
In November 2010, for the first time in twenty years, Myanmar 
held parliamentary elections. 406   Myanmar had not had a civilian 
government since 1962.407  The elections were strongly criticized as being 
unfair, by parties ranging from leading politicians inside Myanmar, to the 
U.N. Secretary-General, to U.S. President Barack Obama.408  Few were 
optimistic about change, particularly because a quarter of parliamentary 
seats were reserved for military appointees.409  In March 2011, hardliner 
and longtime military junta leader Senior General Than Shwe stepped 
down from power, making way for the new President, ex-general and 
former Prime Minister Thein Sein.  Again, few had hopes for meaningful 
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reform.410  Since then, however, political developments under the new 
president—including the loosening of censorship, the release of some 
political prisoners, a new law legalizing independent trade unions, the 
suspension of work on a USD $3.6 billion dam being built by China, the 
rewriting of tax and property ownership laws, an increase in civil servant 
pay to prevent corruption, the convening of a national human rights 
commission, and an agreement to end forced labor411—have “stunned 
observers inside and outside the country.”412 
 Outside leaders have urged caution in accepting these changes too 
optimistically.413  It is still too soon to know the long-term effect of the 
recent thaw.  If sustained, however, a pattern of reforms, and a new spirit 
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of international cooperation, could fundamentally change Myanmar’s 
relationship with the West and with China.  The immediate effect of these 
developments is that any hope for a Commission of Inquiry or ICC 
referral is unrealistic, because, even leaving China aside, Western powers 
do not have the political will to seriously raise issues of justice and 
criminal accountability while they are hoping for democratic change.414  
But it is important to observe that if there is a lack of will to investigate 
and prosecute crimes, it may be rooted in Western hopes for democracy 
and liberalization, rather than based on either the absence of serious 
crimes, or China’s refusal to cooperate. 
X. CONCLUSION 
Recent signs of democratic change in Myanmar have obscured 
efforts to seek justice for victims of heinous crimes.  Calls for 
accountability—including a U.N. Commission of Inquiry—seem at this 
point less realistic than they were even a year or two ago.  It is premature, 
however, to declare Myanmar a reformed nation.  Armed conflict, and 
reports of widespread sexual violence, have continued even since the new 
government took power.  Many believe that Senior General Than Shwe 
continues to pull the strings of power.415 
                                                
414 One of the strongest legal arguments against referring Myanmar to the ICC in the midst 
of its recent reforms is that the situation arguably may not satisfy the Rome Statute’s 
Article 13(b) requirement that the situation pose a threat to international peace and 
security.  Interestingly, the Security Council has decided that even situations that appear 
purely internal can constitute threats to international peace and security.  See S.K. VERMA, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 450 (2004); Chiyuki Aoi, Peace 
Support Operations: Contemporary Challenges and the Role of Japan, 3 POL’Y 
PERSPECTIVES, Mar. 2007, available at http://www.rips.or.jp/research/policy-perspectives-
3.html; Frequently Asked Questions About Burma and the International Criminal Court, 
GLOBAL JUSTICE CTR., at 3–4, 
http://globaljusticecenter.net/publications/Advocacytools/FAQ_ICC_Referral%20_Eng.pdf 
(last visited July 25, 2012).  A Commission of Inquiry in Myanmar could still be 
appropriate because it could provide evidence to help the Security Council determine 
whether such a threat to international peace and security exists. 
415 See, e.g., Cris Sholto Heaton, Why Burma Has Huge Potential, MONEYWEEK, Oct. 21, 
2011, http://www.moneyweek.com/news-and-charts/economics/asia/moneyweek-asia-is-
burmas-economy-changing-14300 (“Power remains with the key figures in the military 
junta, headed by Than Shwe, who has been at the top of the group since 1992.”); Robert 
Horn, Is Burma’s Strongman Really Retiring?, TIME, Apr. 11, 2011, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2064470,00.html (“Few Burma watchers, 
and few people in Burma . . . believe 78-year-old Than Shwe has truly called it quits.”); 
Aung Lynn Htut, The History Behind the Talks, THE IRRAWADDY, Sep. 6, 2011, 
http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=22014 (asserting that Than Shwe is still in 
control).  But see Zaw Nay Aung, Than Shwe’s Post-Election Choreography, 
OPEDNEWS.COM, Sept. 29, 2011, http://www.opednews.com/articles/Than-Shwe-s-Post-
Election-by-Zaw-Nay-Aung-110927-388.html (“Very few think that Than Shwe is still 
pulling the strings behind the scene and continues ruling the country.”). 
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 Naturally, China has reacted positively to the apparent changes.  
China would clearly not support a Commission of Inquiry to investigate 
crimes in Myanmar.  However, based on its foreign policy objectives, its 
historical voting behavior on the Security Council, its experience with the 
referral of Sudan to the ICC, and its economic and political relationships 
with Sudan and Myanmar, it is not clear that China would veto such a 
commission. 
 Over the past twenty years, China has gradually shifted from strict 
defense of national sovereignty to reluctant acceptance of international 
interventions.  The value it places on international prestige, economic 
growth, and political stability is at times detrimental to its allies.  China’s 
voting record on the Security Council reflects its disinclination to use its 
veto power; instead, China abstains to appease rivals, foes, and allies.  
Surprisingly, China abstained from resolutions requesting a Commission 
of Inquiry to investigate Darfur, and referring the Darfur situation to the 
ICC.  These abstentions had negligible adverse impact on China’s 
relationship with Sudan.  Furthermore, the economic disparities between 
China and its smaller allies indicate that it has the ability to vote as it 
wishes without inordinate concern about the consequences. 
 The ICC is not the only option for Myanmar.  In recent years, 
nations recovering from internal wars and government-perpetrated 
atrocities have created their own judicial mechanisms, sometimes with 
U.N. collaboration, to provide a forum for victims and accountability for 
perpetrators.  The International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, 
and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, are just three 
examples of how justice, accountability, and reconciliation can be tailored 
to reflect a country’s unique culture, history, and objectives.  It is difficult 
to predict what Myanmar will do, if anything, to account for past 
injustices.  Given the military’s dominance of the current government,416 
any internal Myanmar action in the immediate future to prosecute current 
or past military leaders is extremely unlikely.  But justice takes time.  The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was established 
in 1993 to account for crimes committed from 1991 to 2001;417 South 
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established in 1995 to 
investigate crimes that occurred between March 1, 1960 and May 10, 
1994;418 and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia were 
                                                
416 Human Rights Watch, Burma: US Backtracks on ‘Responsible Investment’ Pledge, July 
11, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/07/11/burma-us-backtracks-responsible-
investment-pledge (“The Burmese government remains dominated by the military, which 
under Burma’s 2008 constitution enjoys legal supremacy over civilian authorities.”). 
417  About the ICTY, INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, 
http://www.icty.org/sid/3 (last visited Aug. 1, 2012). 
418  TRC: The Facts, BBC NEWS, Oct. 30, 1998, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/1998/10/98/truth_and_reconciliation/142369.stm. 
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established in 2003 to bring former government leaders to trial for crimes 
committed between 1975 and 1979.419 
 Advocates for Burmese victims hoped to accelerate the judicial 
process by directly requesting the U.N. Security Council to refer the 
situation in Myanmar to the ICC.  Ironically, however, the ultimate fate of 
calls for a Commission of Inquiry or Article 13(b) referral is probably in 
the hands of Myanmar’s leaders.420  If fundamental reforms are sustained, 
such calls may wither away.  But if reforms do not last, if government 
oppression is renewed, or if there is a military coup d’état, no one should 
be surprised if the United Nations decides to act, and no one should be 
surprised if China declines to stand in its way. 
                                                
419  Judge Resigns Citing Interference, RADIO FREE ASIA, Mar. 19, 2012, 
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/resignation-03192012165430.html. 
420 The recent reforms in Myanmar, and turnover in its leadership, have likely reduced the 
influence of those military leaders who would be most likely to be charged with war 
crimes, making their protection by allies both inside and outside of the country less likely.  
Cf. Max du Plessis & Christopher Gevers, UNSC Referral of Libya Gives ICC the 
Opportunity to Prove Its Worth, INST. FOR SEC. STUD., Mar. 4, 2011, 
http://www.issafrica.org/iss_today.php?ID=1243 (arguing that African nations supported 
the referral of Libya to the ICC because Libya’s leader, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, had 
become “yesterday’s man”). 
